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ALASKA V. FIV BARANOF: STATE REGULATION 




The enactment of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act 
of 19761 (MFCMA) marked a new era concerning federal regulation 
of fisheries off American shores. The MFCMA, better known as the 
Magnuson Act, with its complementary goals of conservation and 
management, represented the first federal attempt at comprehensive 
management of ocean fisheries. 2 Prior to the passage of the MFCMA, 
fishery management was left primarily to the states. 3 The relaxed 
posture of the federal government, however, failed to provide for 
effective management of ocean fisheries, particularly over foreign 
fishing operations within two hundred miles of the U. S. coast. 4 
The inadequacies of international treaties and enforcement policies 
were the primary catalyst for the passage of the Magnuson Act. 5 
* Managing and Articles Editor, 1985-1986, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 
LAW REVIEW. 
1 Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90 Stat. 331 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-82 (1976)). The official 
title of the Act was later changed to the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management 
Act. Pub. L. No. 96-561 § 238, 94 Stat. 3296 (amending 16 U.S.C. § 1801 (1982)). 
2 H.R. REP. No. 445, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 44, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 593, 612 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 445]. 
3 H.R. REP. No. 445, supra note 2, at 29-30. The Magnuson Act defines a "fishery" as: (A) 
one or more stocks of fish which can be treated as a unit for purposes of conservation and 
management and which are identified on the basis of geographical, scientific, technical, rec-
reational, and economic characteristics; and (B) any fishing for such stocks. 16 U.S.C. § 1802(7) 
(1982). 
4Id. 
5 STAFF OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., REPORT ON 
NATIONAL OCEAN POLICY STUDY 229 (Comm. Print 1976). Sen. Kennedy made the following 
statement: 
while our stocks continue to be depleted, the number of foreign fishing vessels off 
our coast increases each year and the American fishing industry continues to decline. 
281 
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Technological innovations after World War II gave rise to intensified 
fishing efforts in the fertile waters off the American coast.6 Congress 
found that while the yield of American commercial fishermen re-
mained constant during the 1960's, the average catch from mechan-
ically sophisticated foreign fishing vessels had risen dramatically. 7 
This was because the harvest quota levels negotiated by the State 
Department substantially exceeded the maximum sustainable yields 
for the species involved. 8 In addition, enforcement of these multi-
national agreements was ordinarily vested in each member country 
with respect to its own vessels. 9 All too often the result was nonen-
forcement. 1o Due to the combination of these factors, Congress found 
a serious depletion in the stocks of at least ten major fisheries by 
1975. 11 
The problems resulting from these bilateral agreements with for-
eign nations· led to increased pressure on Congress to support the 
domestic fishing industry and to protect the valuable food fish located 
off the American coast. 12 Congress responded to this widespread call 
for federal involvement by enacting the Magnuson Act. 13 The 
MFCMA created the Fishery Conservation Zone, which extended 
ocean jurisdiction out two hundred miles from the United States 
shoreline. 14 As a result, 2,500,000 square miles of ocean and approx-
imately twenty percent of the world's fisheries were brought under 
United States control.15 Basically, the Magnuson Act sets the Fish-
ery Conservation Zone as the 197-mile band between the individual 
states' three-mile territorial sea and the two hundred-mile limit 
drawn from the shoreline. 16 
Prior to the Magnuson Act, fishery regulation was carried out by 
the states pursuant to their traditionally recognized police powers. 17 
Massachusetts fishermen in 75 foot long vessels are watching 400 foot factory trawlers 
from other nations take seventy percent of the fish within two hundred miles of the 
North Atlantic coast. 
6 H.R. REP. No. 445, supra note 2, at 34. 
7Id. at 32. 
BId. 
9 Greenberg & Shapiro, Federalism in the Fishery Conservation Zone, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 
641, 648 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Greenberg and Shapirol. 
10 Id. 
11 H.R; REP. No. 445, supra note 2, at 36. 
12 Greenberg & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 648. 
13 16 U.S.C. § 1801 (1982). 
14 16 U.S.C. § 1811 (1982). 
15 Greenberg & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 658 n.93 (citing U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, U.S. 
OCEAN POLICY OF THE 1970's: STATUS AND ISSUES, pt. III, at 18 (1978». 
16 16 U.S.C. § 1811 (1982). 
17 U.S. CONST. amend. X (powers not delegated to the federal government by the Consti-
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What limited federal involvement existing before 1976 affected pri-
marily foreign fishing activities. State jurisdiction included all waters 
within three miles of the shoreline, an area historically referred to 
as the territorial sea. 18 For most purposes, the outer boundary of 
the territorial sea was considered the limit of permissible state au-
thority.19 However, the legislatures of coastal states recognized that 
the geographical mobility of both fish stocks and fishermen hampered 
the effectiveness of regulations applying inside the territorial sea. 20 
As a result, the activities of domestic fishermen operating on both 
the territorial and high seas were subject primarily to state scru-
tiny. 21 
Because of its declaration of exclusivity and comprehensive na-
ture, the Magnuson Act appears to sharply limit the regulatory 
jurisdiction states have traditionally exercised over domestic fish-
ermen. 22 In the years immediately following the enactment of the 
MFCMA, a number of commentators assumed that all state extra-
territorial regulation was prohibited since they envisioned a com-
prehensive federal management scheme beyond the territorial sea. 23 
Indeed, according to these commentators, the Magnuson Act re-
quired an extensive management plan for each fishery located in the 
Fishery Conservation Zone. 24 
N ow, nine years after the passage of the Magnuson Act, there is 
a general consensus that it is neither practical nor desirable for this 
much federal regulation of domestic fishing initiatives. 25 The Alaska 
Supreme Court's decision in Alaska v. FN Baranoj26 signals a ju-
tution, nor granted to the people, are reserved to the states). See also, Alaska v. Arctic Maid, 
366 U.S. 199 (1961); Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941); Manchester v. Massachusetts, 
139 U.S. 240 (1891). 
18 Gross, The Maritime Boundaries of the States, 64 MICH. L. REV. 639, 640 (1966). The 
"Cannon Shot" rule of customary international law set the seaward boundary of the territorial 
sea at three miles, based upon the premise that the coastal state could control and protect 
territory only up to the maximum range of its land-based firepower. 
19Id. at 644. 
20 Taylor, Recent State Court Decisions Create Uncertainty For State Extraterritorial Ju-
risdiction, TERRITORIAL SEA, Vol. III, No.1 at 6 (1983). 
21Id. 
22 Curtis, Alaska's Regulation of King Crab on the Outer Continental Shelf, 6 U.C.L.A.-
ALASKA L.REV. 375, 405 (1977); Schoenbaum & McDonald, State Management of Marine 
Fisheries After the FCMA of 1976: An Accommodation of State, Federal, and International 
Interests, 10 CASE W. RES. J. INTL. L. 703, 731 (1978). 
23 Schoenbaum & McDonald, supra note 22, at 738. 
24 Id. 
25 Alaska v. FIV Baranof, 677 P.2d. 1245 (Alaska 1984), cen. denied, 105 S. Ct. 98 (1984); 
see also Anderson Seafoods v. Graham, 529 F. Supp. 512 (N.D. Fla. 1982); People v. Weeren, 
26 Cal. 3d 654,607 P.2d 1279, 163 Cal. Rpt~. 255, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980). 
26 Baranof, 677 P.2d at 1250. 
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dicial recognition that the scope of federal jurisdiction over domestic 
fishermen operating beyond the territorial sea is to be more limited. 
The decision in Barano.f7 stands for the principle that state fishery 
regulation on the high seas should be allowed when it promotes 
management and conservation, which are the complementary goals 
of the Magnuson Act. More effective fishery management will result 
when the burden of domestic regulation is borne by both levels of 
government, enabling federal authorities to concentrate on foreign 
fishing operations within the FCZ, the primary cause of the over-
fishing problem. 
The first section of this article provides a general overview of the 
bases of state regulation of fishing activities on the high seas. This 
section examines the permissible means chosen by the states to 
broaden the scope of their regulatory jurisdiction by managing fish-
eries beyond the three-mile limit of the territorial sea. 28 The next 
section analyzes the goals and scope of federal authority under the 
Magnuson Act. The two major goals of the Magnuson Act are: 1) to 
conserve the fishery resources found off the coast of the United 
States29 and 2) to assume primary management authority over all 
fish within the Fishery Conservation Zone. 30 The final section dis-
cusses the balance of power between the state and federal govern-
ments concerning the management of ocean fisheries since the pas-
sage of the Magnuson Act. In particular, this section focuses on the 
major areas of dispute over the appropriate application of the Mag-
nuson Act as litigated in Baranof.31 
This article concludes that a system of state extraterritorial en-
forcement is a valuable complement to the federal involvement de-
manded by the Magnuson Act. The Barano.f2 court concluded that 
the Magnuson Act permits state legislatures to enact statutes that 
further the Act's complementary goals of management and conser-
vation. Since many coastal states have enacted systems for manage-
ment of domestic fishing activities, the federal authorities should 
now concentrate enforcement activities on the source of the over-
fishing problem: the rapid rise in the efficiency and number of foreign 
vessels operating in the Fishery Conservation Zone. 
27Id. at 1251. 
28 See infra notes 40-134. 
29 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801(c)(1) and (3), 1851(a), 1852(h) (1982). 
80 Id. 
31 Baranof, 677 P.2d at 1245. 
32Id. 
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II. STATE EXTRATERRITORIAL FISHERY AUTHORITY PRIOR To 
THE MAGNUSON ACT 
Prior to passage of the Magnuson Act, state fishery management 
was the rule, not the exception. Under the broad grant of police 
power, states maintained primary control over ocean fisheries. 
States traditionally used this authority to regulate citizens33 and 
noncitizens34 within the territorial sea. Many coastal states also 
broadened the scope of their regulatory jurisdiction by managing 
fisheries beyond the three-mile limit of the territorial sea. 
To assert jurisdiction over high seas fishing operations, three basic 
requirements were necessary before a state regulation could pass 
muster under the U. S. Constitution. First, the state had to establish 
a legitimate interest in regulating extraterritorial fisheries. 35 Second, 
the state had to demonstrate a sufficient basis for the assertion of 
jurisdiction over individual fishermen. 36 Third, state regulation of 
ocean fisheries was subject to constraints imposed by the United 
States Constitution. The three most common limitations on the 
states' police power were the Commerce Clause,37 the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause,38 and the Supremacy Clause. 39 
A. Legitimate State Interest: Enforcement and Conservation 
Prior to the enactment of the Magnuson Act, the case law iden-
tified two bases for finding a legitimate state interest in managing 
high seas fisheries: enforcement and conservation. 
When a state has proven that an enforcement problem exists 
within its waters, extraterritorial regulation has been sustained on 
the ground that such regulation is necessary to prevent deception 
by fishermen who claim to harvest their catch on the high seas when, 
33 Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894); Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240 (1891). 
34 Glenovich v. Noerenberg, 346 F. Supp. 1286, 1293 (D. Alaska), afl'd, 409 U.S. 1070 
(1972); Corsa v. Tawes, 149 F. Supp. 771, 776 (D. Md.), afl'd, 355 U.S. 37 (1957). 
35 Bayside Fish Flour Co. v. Gentry, 297 U.S. 422 (1936); State v. Bundrant, 546 P.2d 530 
(Alaska), appeal dismissed sub nom. Uri v. Alaska, 429 U.S. 806 (1976). 
36 Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941); State v. Sieminski, 556 P.2d 929 (Alaska 1976); 
State v. Bundrant, 546 P.2d 530 (Alaska), appeal dismissed sub nom. Uri v. Alaska, 429 U.S. 
806 (1976). 
37 Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See also Alaska v. Arctic Maid, 366 
U.S. 199 (1961); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948). 
38 Privileges and Immunities Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. See also Douglas v. 
Seacoast Products, 431 U.S. 265 (1977); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948). 
39 Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See also Douglas v. Seacoast Products, 
431 U.S. 265 (1977); Bundrant, 546 P.2d at 530. 
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in fact, they obtained their catch within the three-mile limit.40 Since 
it is impossible to distinguish between fish taken from inside and 
outside territorial waters, state enforcement of fishery laws would 
be difficult, if not impossible, if the state were required to prove 
where the fish in question were caught. 41 
The United States Supreme Court recognized this enforcement 
need in Bayside Fish Flour Co. v. Gentry.42 In this case, the Bayside 
Company challenged several California fish and game laws that reg-
ulated the processing of sardines in the state, regardless of where 
the sardines were harvested. 43 The California legislature had enacted 
these statutes to promote effective management of the sardine fish-
ery.44 The legislature determined that the migratory range of sar-
dine, as for many commercial food fish, includes waters within, as 
well as beyond, the territorial sea and that much of the stock was 
harvested from the high seas. 45 For these reasons, the Supreme 
Court upheld the California statutes because their primary purpose 
was determined to be the protection of a local food source, an area 
traditionally considered a state interest.46 The Court also noted that 
this conclusion promoted effective enforcement of the state's fishery 
management scheme within the territorial sea. 47 
In contrast to Bayside Fish Flour CO.,48 an Alaskan case furnishes 
an example of state authority operating without a sufficient enforce-
ment objective to establish a legitimate interest in the extraterri-
torial regulation of a fishery. In Hjelle v. Brooks,49 a group of fish-
40 Comment, The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976: State Regulation of 
Fishing Beyond the Territorial Sea, 31 ME. L. REV. 303, 307 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 
Comment, The Fishery and Conservation Management Act of 1976]. 
41Id. 
42 297 U.S. 422 (1936). 
43 Id. at 424-25. 
44 I d. at 426. Traditional acceptance of state control over food items is based on the policy 
of protecting state citizens from fraudulent food sales as well as on the goal of excluding 
unsafe or unhealthy commodities from the marketplace. See, e.g., Plumely v. Massachusetts, 
155 U.S. 461, 472 (1894); Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 525-29 (1912). 
45Id. at 424. See Van Camp Sea Food Co. v. California, 30 F.2d 111 (9th. Cir. 1929). 
46Id. at 426. See also infra note 59. 
47Id. The Court concluded that this statute provided "a shield against covert depletion of 
the local supply and, thus, tended to effectuate the policy of the law by rendering evasion of 
it less easy." Id. Covert depletion results when fishing vessels enter state waters, engage in 
fishing, move beyond the three-mile limit and then claim their catch from the high seas. Such 
conduct would diminish local fish stocks and the state would have no recourse against these 
vessels since it is impossible to distinguish fish taken in state waters from those taken on the 
high seas. 
48Id. 
49 Hjelle v. Brooks, 377 F. Supp. 430 (D. Alaska 1974). 
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ermen successfully enjoined the enforcement of an Alaskan 
regulation controlling king crab fishing beyond the territorial sea. 
According to the court, the weight of evidence demonstrated that 
the percentage of king crab taken within Alaskan waters was quite 
small in comparison with the percentage taken in the remainder of 
the Bering Sea Shellfish Area. 50 The Bering Sea Shellfish Area was 
a zone restriction; it was an area on the high seas that the Alaskan 
legislature deemed to be economically and environmentally impor-
tant enough to regulate. 51 Since the court found an insufficient per-
centage of crabs located within the territorial sea, petitioner's ar-
gument for effective enforcement of the king crab management plan 
within state waters was dismissed. 52 
In addition to recognizing an enforcement problem within the 
territorial sea, some courts have simply concluded that coastal states 
have a legitimate conservation interest in the regulation of high seas 
fisheries. For example, in Kenny v. Kirk,53 a Florida court found 
that a state's interest in conservation alone was sufficient to support 
their claim to high seas jurisdiction. In Kenny,54 the disputed statute 
called for a closed season when taking saltwater crawfish both inside 
and outside territorial waters. This court held that conservation of 
the crawfish fishery on the high seas was a sufficient state interest 
to withstand due process and commerce clause challenges. 55 
More recently, in State v. Bundrant,56 the Alaska Supreme Court 
concluded that conservation was a sufficient state interest to permit 
50 377 F. Supp. at 441. 
51 ALASKA STAT. ANN. §§ 16.10.180, .190, .250 (1983). 
52 377 F. Supp. at 442. The percentage of king crab taken within Alaskan waters was small 
in comparison to the amount taken in the rest of the Bering Sea Shellfish Area. The Alaskan 
fishing regulations which purported to close crab fishing in the entire Bering Sea Shellfish 
Area after the quota of crab had been reached and which prohibited possession in Alaska only 
of crab taken seaward of Alaskan waters had a direct impact on extraterritorial conduct. As 
a result, there was not a sufficient nexus between the regulations and the state's interest in 
conserving crab fishing within Alaskan waters to withstand constitutional challenge. 
63 212 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 1968). 
54 [d. at 297. 
55 [d. 
56 Bundrant, 546 P.2d at 530. The Alaska Supreme Court held that regulation of crabbing 
on the Bering Sea, both within and without the three-mile limit, was not under the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the national government. Neither the Submerged Lands Act, nor the Outer 
Continental Shelf Land Act, had preempted regulation of sedentary marine life on the outer 
continental shelf. The court also concluded that Alaska had the power to prosecute nonresi-
dents arrested on the high seas for violations of Alaskan crabbing regulations. [d. at 530. 
Concerning the conservation principle, the state was allowed to extend its jurisdiction to 
control marine resources outside the territorial sovereignty of Alaska when the exercise was 
based on conservation principles inherent in their migratory characteristics and not based on 
artificial boundaries or political circumstances. [d. at 554. 
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extraterritorial regulation of the king crab fishery. The Bundrant57 
court found that the existence of an enforcement problem in state 
waters was not a necessary precondition for a finding that Alaska 
had a legitimate interest in controlling a fishery on the high seas. 
As in Hjelle v. Brooks, 58 this case focused on an Alaskan statute 
regulating the king crab, a valuable state resource. The court de-
scribed the crab's life cycle, which begins along the shoreline and 
ends in the deeper waters of the Bering Sea, thus emphasizing the 
interdependence of local and extraterritorial resources. 59 As a result, 
the court found that an Alaskan management scheme encompassing 
the entire migratory range of the king crab was necessary because 
unregulated fishing outside state waters could lead to the destruction 
of the fishery. 60 
B. Personal Jurisdiction 
In addition to establishing a legitimate interest in regulating a 
high seas fishery under the police powers, states were required to 
assert sufficient personal jurisdiction over individuals operating be-
yond the territorial sea. The previous section addressed the issue of 
state authority to regulate extraterritorial fisheries. This section 
involves a different although related matter; that is state court 
jurisdiction to enforce these legislative directives over the violating 
parties. Courts have found three independent bases sufficient to 
establish personal jurisdiction; they are state citizenship,61 landing 
laws,62 and jurisdiction based on minimum contacts between the 
nonresident and the forum state. 63 
57 Bundrant, 546 P.2d at 552-53. 
58 Id. at 540-41. ALASKA STAT. ANN. §§ 16.05.720,16.10.200 (1983). 
59 Id. at 551. Most of the developmental stages in a crab's life occur in the territorial waters 
of the state. Overfishing during these developmental periods could deplete the entire stock of 
the fishery to a point where the species is endangered. 
60 Id. This limited circumscription on the freedom of high seas fishing is based, in part, on 
a recognition of the special interest that a coastal state has in the living resources adjacent 
to territorial waters. See generally, Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living 
Resources of the High Seas, April 29, 1966, art. 6, § 1, 17 U.S.T. 138, 141, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 
559 U.N.T.S. 285. 
61 Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941). The Skiriotes Doctrine, which stands for the 
notion that, absent some federal statutory restriction, state citizenship is a sufficient basis for 
jurisdiction, was partially eroded by the Magnuson Act. State jurisdiction is now based on 
the registration requirement of 16 U.S.C. § 1856(a) (1982). See infra notes 210-55. 
62 Bayside Fish Flour Co. v. Gentry, 297 U.S. 422 (1936). 
63 State v. Bundrant, 546 P.2d 530 (Alaska), appeal dismissed sub. nom. Uri v. Alaska, 429 
U.S. 806 (1976); State v. Sieminski, 556 P.2d 929 (Alaska 1976). 
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1. State Citizenship 
The right of a state to regulate the extraterritorial fishing activi-
ties of its citizens was recognized in 1941 by the United States 
Supreme Court in Skiriotes v. Florida. 64 The defendant Skiriotes 
was convicted of violating state law by using illegal diving apparatus 
while taking sponges in waters outside Florida's territorial sea. 65 
The Supreme Court held that, even when the statute claimed juris-
diction over only territorial waters, the state's authority was not so 
restrained: 
if the United States may control the conduct of its citizens on 
the high seas, we see no reason why the State of Florida may 
not likewise govern the conduct of its citizens upon the high seas 
with respect to matters in which the state has a legitimate 
interest and there is not conflict with Congress. 66 
Skiriotes67 was important precedent for state fishing management 
interests since it allowed an easy manner to assert personal juris-
diction. The so-called Skiriotes68 jurisdiction permitted the coastal 
states to govern the conduct of its citizens on the high seas with 
respect to matters in which the state had a legitimate interest. As 
a result of this decision, most jurisdictional disputes involving state 
citizens prior to the Magnuson Act focused upon the legitimacy of 
the state interest, that is, whether the state's regulation was within 
the scope of its police powers. 
2. Landing Laws 
Coastal states also obtained personal jurisdiction over fishermen 
operating on the high seas by enacting landing laws, since any vio-
lator of one of these statutes was deemed to be subject to state 
64 313 U.S. 69 (1941). 
65 Id. at 69. FLA. COMPo GEN. LAWS § 8087 (1927). The current version is FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 370.17(2) (West 1974). See also Lipscomb V. Gialourakis 101 Fla. 1130, 133 So. 104 (1931). 
66 Id. at 77. 
67 I d. Florida state and federal courts have curtailed another aspect of Skiriotes jurisdiction. 
The Court has implied that the state's regulations apply beyond the territorial sea. Recently, 
the Florida Supreme Court held that another states restrictions apply beyond Florida's waters 
only if the legislature expressly declares an intent that the statute apply extraterritorially. 
Southeastern Fisheries v. Dept. of Natural Resources, 453 So. 2d 1351, 1353 (Fla. 1984), 
aff'd, Bethell V. Florida, 741 F.2d 1341 (lith Cir. 1984). 
68 Comment, The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, supra note 40, at 
313. 
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jurisdiction.69 For many years, states adopted landing laws to make 
it unlawful to land, transport, or possess fish at state ports in vio-
lation of specific requirements. 7o Typical landing laws specify the 
quota of fish harvested per vessel, the size of the particular fish, or 
the species of fish caught. 71 These laws represented a practical so-
lution to the enforcement problems of coastal states. Without these 
statutes, fishing vessels could capture their prey within state waters, 
but claim they were taken on the high seas. 72 Because an ocean 
patrol to observe fishing operations would be of prohibitive expense, 
the restrictions imposed at i:ltate ports through landing laws repre-
sent a practical method for the enforcement of commercial fishing 
regulations. 73 
Landing laws are also important tools in the enhancement and 
conservation of migratory fish populations. 74 The restrictions im-
posed under a landing law do not distinguish between those fish 
caught within state waters and those harvested on the high seas. 75 
Since many species of fish move freely between the territorial and 
high seas, state landing laws in operation apply to the adjacent 
extraterritorial zone, thereby increasing the enforcement jurisdic-
tion of coastal states. 76 Thus, a state's enactment of a landing law is 
evidence that the state legislature considers the regulation of a 
fishery on both sides of the boundary line of sufficient state interest 
to subject violators to the jurisdiction of the coastal state's courts. 
In Bayside Fish Flour Co. v. Gentry,77 the Supreme Court upheld 
a landing law that regulated the processing of sardines in California, 
69 Frach v. Schoettler, 46 Wash. 2d. 281, 280 P.2d 1038 (1955). In this case, the court 
sustained a Washington statute prohibiting the transportation in state waters or the delivery 
to state ports of salmon caught during closed seasons. The court established personal juris-
diction by holding the possession and sale of salmon to be subject to the state's power to 
regulate its natural resources. Even though the fish were taken beyond the territorial sea, 
the Washington Supreme Court found that regulation of possession and sale fell within the 
state's jurisdiction. 
70 Greenberg & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 652. 
71 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 23:5-1 (West Supp. 1981) (prohibits the taking or possession of bass, 
salmon, or perch during certain seasons); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 16.10.200 (1984) (concerns 
the unlawful taking, sale, or possession offish and shellfish); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 20-4-10 (1982) 
(unlawful possession or sale of undersized bass); WASH. CODE ANN. TIT. 75-18.050 (West 
1984) (unlawful possession or transportation of chinook salmon from a certain district). 
72 Greenberg & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 652. 
73 Id. 
74 Comment, The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, supra note 40, at 
307. 
75 See N.J. STAT. ANN § 23:5-5.7 (West Supp. 1981) ("No person shall, sell, possess, or 
offer for sale, any striped bass measuring less than eighteen inches in length, whether caught 
within the jurisdictional limits of this state or otherwise"). 
76Id. 
77 297 U.S. 422 (1936). CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 1064 (1933) was one provision enforced 
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regardless of whether the fish were caught inside or outside state 
waters. California successfully established a legitimate state interest 
by revealing that the protection of a local food source lies within the 
general grant of the state's police power.78 The court also found the 
landing of the fish to be a significant enough contact with California 
to enable the court to assert personal jurisdiction over the Bayside 
Company. 79 
3. State Regulation of Noncitizens 
In State v. Bundrant,80 the Alaska Supreme Court enlarged the 
traditionally recognized bases for asserting state jurisdiction over 
fishermen. The court broadened the Skiriotes jurisdiction, which 
granted high seas authority over all state citizens, to include any 
Americans having minimum contacts with the state. 81 The basic 
rationale of the Bundrant82 court was that if these individuals had 
enough contacts with the state to derive a benefit from Alaskan 
resourcesr,-; then the state could impose requirements or burdens on 
these individuals. 
The Bundrant83 case involved the appellate review of a trial court's 
conviction of nonresident fishermen found violating king crab closure 
regulations. The Alaskan statute at issue prohibited the capture of 
the crabs within a specified area located sixteen to sixty miles off-
shore. 84 King crab harvesting was prohibited in this closed area in 
an attempt by the legislature to encourage the repopulation of the 
by the state: ''[!]t is unlawful to cause or permit any deterioration or waste of any fish taken 
within the waters of this state, or brought into the state, or to take, receive or agree to 
receive more fish than can be used without deterioration, waste, or spoilage. Except as allowed 
by this code, it is unlawful to use any fish or part thereof, except fish offal in a reduction plant 
or by a reduction process." 
78 [d. at 426. 
79 [d. at 424. Judicial review of state extraterritorial regulation generally searches for a 
relationship between the I'egulated entity and the particular state. Bayside Fish represents 
a decision that the possession of fish stock in state waters establishes the required nexus for 
jurisdiction over the parties. 
80 546 P.2d 530 (Alaska), appeal dismissed sub nom. Uri v. Alaska, 429 U.S. 806 (1976). 
81 [d. See also Greenberg & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 653. 
82 546 P.2d at 555-56. 
83 [d. at 533-34. These regulations prohibit the taking and possession of crabs within a 
closed area. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 34.005 (May 1974) created statistical areas con-
sisting of: 
1. a registration area comprising of all the waters within the statistical area which are 
waters subject to the jurisdiction of the state 
2. an adjacent seaward biological influence zone comprising of all the waters within the 
statistical area which are not part of the registration area. 
84 ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 34.005 (May 1974). 
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species. 85 The primary difference between this closure regulation 
and a landing law is that the crabs do not have to be possessed in 
an Alaskan port or transported in state waters in order to violate 
the closure statute. 
The Alaskan Supreme Court took an interesting approach to es-
tablish personal and subject-matter jurisdiction over the sixteen 
fishermen involved in this case. To assert personal jurisdiction, the 
court in Bundrant86 held that Alaska could control the conduct of 
nonresidents on the high seas whenever they derive a benefit from 
the resources of the state. The court reasoned that acts done outside 
a state that produce detrimental effects inside the state justify the 
punishment of the one who caused the harm, just as though he had 
been present at the place of its effect. 87 The state successfully argued 
that the unregulated capture of king crabs on the high seas would 
emasculate the state's management plan. 88 
As part of this benefit-burden analysis, the court held that the 
nonresidents must have various contacts with the state in order to 
be subject to Alaskan regulation. 89 The Alaska Attorney General's 
office established that there were extensive contacts between the 
fishermen and the state: the fishermen held Alaskan commercial 
fishing licenses; they registered their vessels in the state; and they 
made use of Alaskan warehouses, fuel depots, repair yards, and 
other service operations. 90 
Although it took a new step, the court in Bundrant91 followed the 
pattern of earlier decisions by recognizing that extraterritorial fish-
eries jurisdiction must be premised upon a clear nexus between state 
interests and the high seas resource. It is clear that a state can 
demonstrate an important interest in any stock that migrates be-
85 Bundrant, 546 P.2d at 557 (Rabinowitz, J., concurrence). 
86 [d. at 556. The Alaska Supreme Court applied the reasoning of Jacobson v. Maryland 
Racing Comm., 261 Md. 180, 274 A.2d 102 (1971). There, appellant, Jacobson, was licensed 
in Maryland to own and train horses. He acquired three horses in a Maryland claim race and 
within 60 days sold these horses in N ew York. The Maryland court determined that although 
the sale occurred in New York, it violated Maryland regulations since Jacobson had become 
a "racing citizen" of Maryland. This implied citizenship gave the state a sufficient basis of 
personal jurisdiction over Jacobson in matters concerning licensed horse racing. This allowed 
the court to enjoin the sale of these horses. 
The Bundrant court found, by analogy, that Alaska could control the conduct of nonresidents 
when their conduct has a detrimental impact inside the state. 
87 [d. 
88 [d. at 554. 
89 [d. at 556 n.106. 
90 Greenberg & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 653. 
91 546 P.2d 530 (Alaska), appeal dismissed sub nom. Uri v. Alaska, 429 U.S. 806 (1976). 
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tween state waters and the adjacent high seas, if it is established 
that the stock serves as a source of food and income for the people 
of that state. 92 Most courts recognize that effective fishery manage-
ment beyond the territorial sea is often necessary in order to assure 
an ongoing yield from that stock. 93 The significance of the court's 
decision in Bundrant94 is that the Alaskan Supreme Court realized 
that proper management of the king crab fishery is impossible with-
out state jurisdiction over nonresident fishing operations on the high 
seas. 95 By establishing jurisdiction over nonresidents who violated 
statutes other than landing laws, the decision in Bundrant96 filled a 
void left by Bayside Fish97 and Skiriotes. 98 The Bundrant99 court 
helped to fulfill the ultimate goal of rebuilding the fish stock for 
future generations through a uniform system of regulation. 100 
C. Constitutional Limits On The Exercise Of State Authority 
Constitutional constraints limit the scope of state police power 
with respect to ocean fishing. Because the tenth amendment is 
phrased in residual language, the state police power can be described 
only by reference to matters beyond its scope as they are delineated 
by the other provisions of the Constitution.101 The tenth amendment 
assigns to the states the power "not delegated to the United States 
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states."102 As a result, 
the source of federal constraints on the exercise of state police power 
92 The State of Alaska has played a leading role in the conservation of offshore resources. 
This is particularly true with respect to the king crab fishery, which constitutes a vital part 
of the economy of western Alaska. See Alaskan King Crab Marketing and Quality Control 
Act, ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.90.010 (1974) (repealed 1984). 
The Alaska legislature found management controls were necessary since otherwise the king 
crab fishery would be open to overfishing resulting in a depletion below minimum levels of 
sustained yield. Since the federal government had expressed no intention to occupy this field, 
the State of Alaska assumed primary responsibility for the conservation of the king crab 
fishery on the high seas. 
93 Bundrant, 546 P.2d at 552-54. 
94 546 P.2d 530 (Alaska), appeal dismissed sub nom. Uri v. Alaska, 429 U.S. 806 (1976). 
95 [d. at 554-55. The Bundrant court concluded that "[iJf the state has no authority to 
regulate nonresident fishermen, it has no effective authority to regulate the fishery". 
96 [d. 
97 297 U.S. 422. 
98 313 U.S. 69. 
99 546 P.2d 530 (Alaska), appeal dismissed sub nom. Uri v. Alaska, 429 U.S. 806 (1976). 
100 Comment, The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, supra note 40 at 
321. 
101 Curtis, Alaska's Regulation of King Crab on the Outer Continental Shelf, 6 U.C.L.A.-
ALASKA L. REV. 375, 399 (1978). 
102 U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
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are the limitations expressly set forth in the Constitution. l03 In cases 
involving state fishing regulations, the most commonly asserted chal-
lenges are based on the Commerce Clause,104 the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause,105 and the Supremacy Clause. 106 
1. The Commerce Clause 
As a general rule, states may not adopt local fishing regulations 
that unduly burden interstate commerce. 107 For example, in Foster 
Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 108 the Supreme Court struck down 
a Louisiana statute which, in effect, required that all shrimp taken 
in state waters be processed in Louisiana prior to interstate ship-
ment.109 Louisiana argued that the Shrimp Act was premised on a 
valid conservation purpose. 110 The Foster Fountain111 Court rejected 
the state's argument, and noted that, in challenging the validity of 
a statute on the ground that it is repugnant to the Commerce Clause, 
the Court is not bound by the state's declaration of purpose but may 
find that the practical operation of the statute's provisions directly 
burden interstate commerce. The Court held that the Louisiana 
Shrimp Act had no valid conservation purpose, but was instead 
designed to benefit Louisiana shrimp processors. 112 As a result, the 
Louisiana Shrimp Act was found constitutionally defective in that it 
burdened interstate commerce by having no reasonable relation to 
a valid exercise of the state police power. 113 
103 NOWAK, ROTUNDA, AND YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, Ch. 10, § C at 302 (West 2d 
ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as NOWAKJ. 
104 Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. 
105 Privileges and Immunities Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. 
106 Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
107 Greenberg & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 655. 
108 278 U.S. 1 (1942). 
109 The Louisiana Shrimp Act of 1926, as interpreted in Foster-Fountain v. Packing Haydel, 
278 U.S. 1 (1942), declared that all shrimp and parts thereof in Louisiana waters are property 
of the state. The statute forbade the exportation of shrimp from which the head and shells 
have not been removed, but granted the taker a qualified interest which may be sold within 
the state. The meat did belong to the taker and could be moved beyond the state without 
restriction. The raw shells, however, were not allowed to be exported. 
In effect, the statute required in-state processing of shrimp prior to interstate shipment. 
The Court found that this legislation was primarily designed to help a Louisiana shrimp 
processing plant and was therefore unconstitutional. Id. at 11. 
llO Foster-Fountain Packing, 278 U.S. at 4. 
III Id. at 13 (citing Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896)). 
ll2Id. at 10. 
ll3 I d. at 13. 
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2. The Privileges and Immunities Clause 
In addition to limits imposed by the Commerce Clause, states may 
not adopt fishing regulations that impermissibly discriminate against 
noncitizens. 114 Any discriminatory treatment between citizens and 
noncitizens must be justifiable under the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause. 115 This clause is a special type of equal protection provision 
which guarantees to all citizens that classifications which burden 
persons because they are not state citizens must reasonably relate 
to a legitimate state purpose. 116 
In Toomer v. Witsell,117 the Court struck down a South Carolina 
statute that imposed a licensing fee on nonresidents one hundred 
times greater than for citizens. The Court found that by requiring 
nonresidents to pay a $2500 license fee for each shrimp boat while 
residents were able to license a boat for $25, South Carolina was 
enforcing an impermissible discrimination under the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause. 118 The test developed in Toomer v. Witsell119 to 
determine a violation of the Article IV Privileges and Immunities 
Clause is whether there are valid reasons for the state to make a 
distinction based on citizenship and, if so, whether the degree of 
discrimination bears a close relation to those reasons. 
The Supreme Court found that South Carolina's justification for 
this discrimination, namely to conserve the shrimp supply, did not 
withstand judicial scrutiny in view of the state's overall management 
plan for the fishery.120 The Court noted that the lack of a statutory 
limit on the number of boats that could be licensed by residents 
evidenced a lack of concern for the conservation of the shrimp fish-
ery.121 Thus, while differing treatment may be valid when reasonably 
related to a legitimate conservation interest, the Toomer122 Court 
held that, in this case, the nonresident license fee was an impermis-
114 Greenberg & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 655. 
115 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. 
116 NOWAK, supra note 103, at 302. 
ll7 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1947). 
118 [d. at 403. 
119 [d. See NOWAK, supra note 103, at 302. 
120 [d. at 397. 
121 [d. at 397, n.30. 
122 [d. at 398. The Toomer court stated: "[n)othing in the record indicates that nonresidents 
use larger boats or different fishing methods than residents, that the cost of enforcing the 
laws against them is appreciably greater, or that any substantial amount of the state's general 
funds is devoted to shrimp conservation. But assuming such were the facts, they would not 
necessarily support a remedy so drastic as to be a near equivalent to total exclusion." 
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sible violation of the guarantees set forth by the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause. 
3. The Supremacy Clause 
Finally, the principles of federal supremacyl23 and preemption124 
are important considerations in the context of state fishery manage-
ment. This is particularly true since the passage of the Magnuson 
Act. Today, the Supremacy Clause has become the principal consti-
tutional constraint on state fishing regulations. 125 The Supremacy 
Clause mandates that a congressional exercise of an enumerated 
power overrides, or preempts, any state regulation where there is 
an actual conflict between the two sets of legislation such that both 
cannot stand. 126 Moreover, where Congress acts pursuant to a plen-
ary power, it may specifically prohibit parallel state legislation. 127 
In a case decided just prior to the enactment of the MFCMA, the 
Supreme Court considered two Virginia statutes that purported to 
limit the right of nonresidents to fish in state waters.l28 In Douglas 
v. Seacoast Products, Inc.,129 the restricted vessels were both en-
rolled and licensed under the documentation laws of the United 
States. These federal vessel licenses explicitly granted fishing priv-
ileges to the holder.130 The Court found that, since the Virginia 
statutes sought to deny nonresidents a federally granted privilege 
to fish on the same terms as Virginia residents, the state laws were 
preempted pursuant to the Supremacy Clause. 131 
The Douglas132 Court emphasized that its holding did not prevent 
states from imposing upon federal licensees reasonable conservation 
measures otherwise within the state's police power. However, the 
Court rejected Virginia's claim that the challenged statutes were 
based on a legitimate conservation objective by noting that the state 
made no attempt to restrict the amount of fish caught by residents. 133 
The Court reasoned that a statute that leaves a state's residents 
123 U.S. CaNST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
124 See infra notes 291--348. 
125 Greenberg & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 656. 
126 NOWAK, supra note 103, at 292. 
127 [d. 
128 Douglas v. Seacoast Products, 431 U.S. 265 (1977). 
129 [d. See Greenberg & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 656. 
130 [d. See also infra notes 225-43. 
131 Greenberg & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 285-87. 
132 [d. at 277. 
133 [d. at 285, n.21. 
I 
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free to deplete a natural resource while excluding nonresidents can-
not serve a valid conservation purpose. 134 
III. THE MFCMA - THE SCOPE OF FEDERAL 
EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION 
A. Background 
As noted above, the Magnuson Act was the first attempt by the 
federal government to create a uniform management scheme for 
marine resources on the high seas. The MFCMA represents a 
congressional response to two basic problems in fishery management 
plans. First, the international agreements entered into by the United 
States were ineffective in safeguarding ocean fishery stocks. 135 Con-
gress found that the decline in many of the fisheries off the United 
States coast coincided with increased foreign fishing in areas outside 
the territorial sea. 136 The diplomatic efforts were simply not suc-
cessful in preventing the depletion of the fishery resources of great 
economic importance. 137 Even when international agreements have 
been reached, the problem of enforcement has been chronic. Tradi-
tionally, international fishery agreements provided that each signa-
tory nation was responsible for enforcement as to their own citi-
zens. 138 Nations like Japan and the USSR, which direct their fleets 
to return a high quota of fish, were not as diligent as is necessary 
to enforce full compliance with international agreements. 139 Congress 
concluded that nations possessing long distance fleets, capable of 
fishing all over the world, were not strongly concerned with con-
serving fisheries in anyone area. 140 In contrast, United States fish-
ermen who live a relatively short distance from fishing grounds have 
a much greater interest in conserving fish that inhabit the waters 
near their homeports.141 
The second problem of previous federal management schemes con-
cerned the inappropriate territorial area set out for regulation. The 
Contiguous Fisheries Zone Act of 1966 extended the regulatory pow-
ers of the federal government over fisheries to twelve nautical miles 
134 [d. 
135 Greenberg & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 658. 
136 H.R. REP. No. 445, supra note 2, at 35. 
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from the United States coast. 142 Except for foreign fishing recognized 
by previous treaty, foreign operations were excluded from this nine-
mile zone contiguous to the territorial sea. 143 The Bartlett Act of 
1964 had already banned foreign fishing vessels from state waters. 144 
By 1976, Congress realized that a twelve-mile coastal zone was not 
effective in protecting the most valuable and overfished species be-
cause these fish often dwell outside this twelve-mile limit. 145 
The Magnuson Act, therefore, expanded federal authority from 
this twelve-mile band to a 197-mile zone. This expansion increased 
the United States' legal jurisdiction from an area of 545,000 square 
nautical miles to over 2.2 million square nautical miles. 146 The inner 
boundary of this Fishery Conservation Zone is a line coterminous 
with the seaward boundary of each of the coastal states, while the 
outer boundary represents the two hundred mile baseline from which 
the territorial sea is measured. 147 In addition to this increased ter-
ritorial jurisdiction, Congress set forth a more complete scheme of 
fishery management. Prior to the passage of the MFCMA, the fed-
eral role was limited mainly to data gathering and inspection of 
foreign fishing activities. 148 The Magnuson Act established an exten-
sive process for the formulation and implementation of regulations 
designed to promote the complementary goals of management and 
conservation. 149 
Although it was primarily a reaction to foreign fishing and a mea-
sure to protect offshore resources, the legislative purpose of the 
Magnuson Act extended beyond these concerns. The legislation was 
designed to provide for the "development . . . administration, and 
enforcement of fishery management plans and regulations . . . for 
fishery conservation and management. "150 The MFCMA was de-
signed to assure both that an optimum supply of fish products be 
available on a "continuing basis and that irreversible or long term 
142 Greenberg & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 648. 
1431d. 
1441d. at 648-49. Pub. L. No. 88-308, 78 Stat. 194 (1964) (repealed 1977). 
1451d. 
146 Greenberg & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 658, n.93, (citing U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 
U.S. OCEAN POLICY IN THE 1970's: STATUS AND ISSUES, part III at p.18 (1978». See also 16 
U.S.C. § 1811 (1982) (establishing the Fishery Conservation Zone at the 200-mile mark). 
147 16 U.S.C. § 1811 (1982). 
148 H.R. REP. No. 445, supra note 2, at 29. 
149 Rogalski, Regional Councils Under The FCMA, 9 B.C. ENVTL AFF. L. REV. 163, 165-
73 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Rogalski]. 
150 S. REP. No. 94-711, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. at 37, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE & CONGo 
AD. NEWS 593, 661. 
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adverse effects on fishery resources be minimized. "151 The legislation 
reflects a congressional awareness that fisheries are vulnerable re-
sources that need careful management and conservation to prosper, 
even in the absence of foreign involvement. 152 
B. Scope of Federal Authority 
To promote its complementary goals of management and conser-
vation, the Magnuson Act vests authority to formulate Fishery Man-
agement Plans in eight regional councils. 153 These Fishery Manage-
ment Councils represent the organizational backbone of the federal 
management regime. l54 The jurisdictional scope of each of the re-
gional councils is extremely large since the Magnuson Act provides 
for exclusive jurisdiction over all fish located in the 197-mile expanse 
of the Fishery Conservation Zone. 155 It is through these councils 
that the needs of the states, the fishing industry, and environmental 
organizations are intended to be channelled. 156 
The extent of local authority under the Magnuson Act is revealed 
by the allotment of voting rights in the Fishery Management Coun-
cils. 157 The voting members of these councils include state fishery 
management officials,158 regional directors of the National Marine 
Fisheries Service,159 and other individuals appointed by the Secre-
tary of Commerce from the lists of persons submitted by the gov-
ernors of the states represented on these councils. 160 On the other 
hand, the nonvoting members of the regional Fishery Management 
Councils are the federal officials responsible for the implementation 
of the council's plans. 161 
151 [d. at 39. 
152 Rogalski, supra note 149, at 170. 
153 Each council is identified according to its constituent states or possessions and has 
responsibility for developing plans for fisheries within its jurisdiction. The eight councils are: 
1) New England (Me., N.H., Mass., R.I., Conn.); 2)Mid-Atlantic (N.Y., N.J., Del., Pa., Md., 
Va.); 3) South Atlantic (N.C., S.C., Ga., Fla.); 4) Gulf (Tex., La., Miss., Ala., Fla.); 5) Pacific 
(Ca., Or., Wash.); 6) North Pacific (Alaska, Wash., Or.); 7) Western Pacific (Hawaii, Am. 
Samoa, Guam); and 8) Carribean Council (V. I. and P. R.). See 16 U.S.C. § 1852(h) (1982). 
154 Rogalski, s'upra note 149, at 171. 
155 16 U.S.C. § 1811 (1982). 
156 H.R. REP. No. 445, supra note 2, at 63. 
157 16 U.S.C. § 1852(b) (1982). 
158 [d. at § 1852(b)(1)(A). 
159 [d. at § 1852(b)(1)(B). 
160 [d. at § 1852(b)(2)(B). 
\61 [d. at 1852(c). 
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The format utilized by the regional councils when preparing fishery 
management schemes is the Fishery Management Plan (FMP).162 
The regional councils are granted authority to prepare FMP's con-
sistent with the seven national standards set forth in the Act. 163 The 
162 [d. at § 1853. The legislative history of the Magnuson Act indicates that FMP's would 
be prepared only on an as-needed basis. See H.R. REP. No. 445, supra note 2, at 66-67. 
(b) Scope of Management Plans (1) In general this paragraph would require any 
management plan prepared by any Council to contain such conservation and other 
measures which the Council deems appropriate with respect to management of the 
species concerned. In addition, the Council would be required to specify such condi-
tions and limitations governing fishing by domestic or foreign vessels as the Council 
believes should be implemented to carry out such measures . . . . 
(3) Specific Plan Requirements - This paragraph would describe in detail the 
specific requirements that could be imposed on a fishery for which the Council has 
prepared a management plan. 
(A) The plan could designate zones where, and designated periods when, fishing 
would be limited, not permitted at all, or permitted only by certain types of vessels 
and gear. 
(B) The plan could establish a system under which access to the fishery would be 
limited both as to domestic and foreign vessels and both as to recreational and 
commercial fishermen. If the system provided for limited entry, then consideration 
would be required to be given by the Council to such things as the present partici-
pation in the fishery concerned, historical fishing practices, value of existing invest-
ments in vessels and gear, capability of existing vessels to engage in other fisheries, 
and the history of compliance with any fisheries regulations imposed pursuant to this 
Act. 
(C) The plan could establish limitations on the catch of fish based on such things 
as area, species, size, number, weight, sex, incidental catch, total biomass, and other 
relevant factors necessary to carry out the policy and purposes of the Act. 
(D) The plan could prohibit, limit, condition, or require the use of specified types 
of fishing gear, vessels, or other equipment or devices for such vessels which may 
be required to facilitate the enforcement of the provisions of this Act. 
(E) The plan could specify those licenses, permits, or fees which could be required 
as a condition to engaging in any fishery regulated by this Act. In this regard, such 
licenses, permits, or fees, could vary between domestic and foreign fishermen, be-
tween different categories of domestic fishermen (both recreational and commercial 
fishermen), and between different categories of foreign fishermen. 
(F) The plan could require the submission to the Secretary of pertinent statistics 
such as the type of gear used, catch by species in numbers of fish or weight thereof, 
areas in which fishing was engaged in, time of fishing, and number of hauls. 
(G) The plan could require such other requirements as the Council deems appro-
priate. 
163 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a) (1982). The seven national standards are: 
(1) Conservation and management measures shall prevent overfishing while achiev-
ing, on a continuing basis, the optimum yield from each fishery. 
(2) Conservation and management measures shall be based on the best scientific 
information available. 
(3) To the extent practicable, an individual stock of fish shall be managed as a unit 
throughout its range and interrelated stocks of fish shall be managed as a unit or in 
close coordination. 
(4) Conservation and management measures shall not discriminate between resi-
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first, and most important, of these seven national standards is to 
prepare plans which achieve and maintain the optimum yield from 
fisheries subject to their management. 164 Optimum yield is a fishery 
management concept which is the biological measure of the safe 
upper limit of the harvest that can be taken year after year without 
diminishing the stock. 165 In addition to satisfying these seven na-
tional standards, an FMP prepared by a council must describe the 
fishery, and include information concerning vessels and gear allowed, 
management costs, actual revenues, and potential revenues. 166 The 
FMP must further specify the capacity of domestic fishermen to 
harvest the optimum yield in relation to allowable foreign fishing. 167 
The comprehensive nature of federal regulation under the Magnuson 
Act is evidenced by the extensive scope of these Fishery Manage-
ment Plans. 
dents of different states. If it becomes necessary to allocate fishing privileges among 
various U.S. fishermen, such allocation shall be (A) fair and equitable to all such 
fishermen, (B) reasonably calculated to promote conservation, and (C) carried out in 
such a manner that no particular individual, corporation, or other entity acquires an 
extensive share of the privileges. 
(5) Conservation and management measures shall, where practicable, promote 
efficiency in the utilization of fishery resources; except that no such measure shall 
have economic allocation as its sole purpose. 
(6) Conservation and management measur~s shall take into account and allow for 
variations among, contingencies in fisheries, fishery resources, and catches. 
(7) Conservation and management measures shall, where practicable, minimize 
costs and avoid unnecessary duplication. 
164 16 U. S. C. § 1851(a)(1) (1982). 
165 "Optimum yield" is defined by MFCMA as that quantity of fish which will provide the 
greatest overall benefit to the nation, with particular reference to food production and rec-
reational opportunities. It is prescribed on the basis of the maximum sustainable yield from 
the fishery as modified by any relevant economic, social, or ecological factor. See 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1802(18) (1982). 
The first step in determining optimum yield is the calculation of maximum sustainable yield. 
This is a fishery management concept which designates the safe upper limit of harvest which 
can be taken consistently without diminishing the stock so that it is truly inexhaustible and 
perpetually renewable. H.R. REP. No. 445, supra note 2, at 47. 
Optimum yield is determined by factoring in such elements as: a recognition of resources 
use other than harvesting, social and economic considerations such as the commercial well-
being of the commercial fishermen, the interests of recreational fishermen, environmental 
quality, demand for fishery products, present conditions and long-term plans of the given fish 
habitat. Fishery Conservation and Management. 50 C.F.R. § 602.2(b)(3) (1978). 
166 16 U.S.C. 1853(a)(2) (1982). 
167Id. at § 1853(a)(4) (1982). In addition, there are a number of aspects of management that 
the councils may consider in a discretionary manner. These include subjecting domestic vessels 
to permit and fee requirements, the designation of zones where vessel and gear restrictions 
apply, and limiting the number or type of vessels in a fishery. See 16 U.S.C. § 1853(b) (1982). 
16 U.S.C. § 1853(b)(5) (1982) is the most important provision for the purposes of this article. 
This section allows an FMP to incorporate the relevant fishery conservation and management 
measures of the coastal states nearest to the fishery. 
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Once prepared by the regional council, a Fishery Management 
Plan is then sent to the Secretary of Commerce, who is required to 
immediately review the plan, and then determine its consistency 
with the seven national standards as well as any other applicable 
laws. 168 The Secretary must also publish notice in the Federal Reg-
ister stating that written data and comments may be submitted 
during a 75-day period beginning on the date of the Secretary's 
receipt of the FMP.169 The FMP will take effect if the Secretary does 
not notify the council of his disapproval before the 95th day from 
receipt,170 or if at any time subsequent to the 75th day, the Secretary 
notifies the council that he does not intend to disapprove or partially 
disapprove of the FMP.l7l Following public review, the Secretary 
issues final regulations and is then responsible for their implemen-
tation.l72 
The provisions of the Magnuson Act, as well as the FMP's created 
by the regional councils, are enforced by the Secretary of Commerce 
through the United States Coast Guard. 173 The Coast Guard and any 
other federal or state agencies that entered into agreement with the 
Secretary, are given broad enforcement powers, including both war-
rantless arrest of individuals and warrantless seizure of vessels. 174 
An authorized officer may also issue citations in lieu of the arrest 
and seizure procedures. 175 
The Magnuson Act also designates exclusive jurisdiction to United 
States District Courts to decide any case or controversy arising 
under the provisions of this Act. 176 The District Courts are granted 
168 [d. at 16 u.s.c. § 1854 (a)(1)(A) (1982). 
169 [d. at § 1854(a)(1)(B). 
170 [d. at § 1854(b)(1)(A). 
171 [d. at § 1854(b)(1)(B). 
172 [d. at § 1855(c). 
173 [d. at § 1861(a). 
174 [d. at § 1861(b)(1). 
Any officer who is authorized ... to enforce the provisions of this chapter may 
(A) with or without a warrant or other process: 
(i) arrest any person, if he has reasonable cause to believe that such person has 
committed such an act prohibited by section 1857 of the title; 
(ii) board, search, or inspect any fishing vessel which is subject to the provisions 
of this chapter; 
(iii) seize any fishing vessel used or employed in, or with to which reasonably 
appears that such vessel was used or employed in, a violation of any provision of this 
chapter; 
(iv) seize any fish (wherever found) taken or retained in violation of any provision 
of this chapter; 
(v) seize any other evidence related to any violation of a provision of this chapter." 
175 [d. at § 1861(c) (1982). 
176 [d. at § 1861(d) (1982). This provision was the focus of one of the controversies in BaranoJ, 
677 P.2d at 1252. See infra notes 256-90. 
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authority to issue restrai,ning orders, impose civil penalties and for-
feiture, impose criminal penalties, or take any other actions in the 
interests of justice. 177 
Through the creation and implementation of Fishery Management 
Plans, the Magnuson Act reveals a congressional attempt to balance 
federal and state interests. For instance, in order to counter-balance 
the heavy state representation in the regional council voting mem-
bership, the MFCMA set up a federal review procedure that limits 
the management policies of the councils. 178 In this sense, the 
MFCMA attempts to balance federal and state interests. The Mag-
nuson Act thus can be viewed as a two-tiered decision-making mech-
anism where basic policy determinations, such as optimum yield and 
management strategies, rest with the councils, while rulemaking 
and enforcement authority is vested with the Secretary of Com-
merce. 179 Since the Magnuson Act itself defers to local fishery man-
agement policy under the federal regime, many courts have held 
that the Magnuson Act implicitly allows for state regulation of ex-
traterritorial fisheries in the absence of an applicable FMP.180 
IV. ALASKA v. FN BARANOF: STATE EXTRATERRITORIAL 
AUTHORITY AFTER THE MAGNUSON ACT 
A. Background 
Despite provisions declaring an exclusive management role in the 
Fishery Conservation Zone, the overall goals of the Magnuson Act 
suggest a more limited federal obligation beyond state waters.181 By 
its own terms, the Magnuson Act was not intended to impose un-
necessary burdens on the commercial fishing industry.182 In fact, 
several sections of the Act indicate the federal role should be limited 
to managing only those fisheries where preparation of an FMP is 
177 [d. at § 1861(d)(1)-(4) (1982). 
178 Rogalski, supra note 149, at 175. 
In a sense, the strictest limit on the councils' power is their lack of ability to regulate. The 
councils set policy for fishery management by formulating plans - FMP's. This policy set by 
the council is translated into law through the promulgation and implementation of regulations 
by the Secretary of Commerce. 
179 [d. at 171-72. 
180 BaranoJ, 677 P.2d 1245 (1984); Anderson Seafoods v. Graham, 529 F.Supp 512 (N.D. 
Fla. 1982); People v. Weeren, 26 Cal. 3d 654, 607 P.2d 1279, 163 Cal. Rptr. 255, cert. denied, 
449 U.S. 873 (1980). 
181 Greenberg & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 665. 
182 [d. 
304 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 13:281 
necessary to achieve the purposes of Congress. 183 This means that 
the Act's basic goals of conservation and management may be met 
in some fisheries where state regulation fulfills the policies and stan-
dards set out in the Magnuson Act. 184 
The decision in Alaska v. F N Barano.f85 signals a judicial recog-
nition of this more limited federal role in the regulation of domestic 
fishing operations. In this case, the Alaska Supreme Court recog-
nized not only that the scope of federal authority over domestic 
fishermen operating beyond the territorial sea need not be exclusive, 
but that state high seas fishery management can help achieve the 
goals of the Magnuson Act. 186 Decisions like the one in Barano.f87 
illustrate the importance of promoting a more cooperative federal-
state relationship in the supervision of domestic fishermen. The 
hopeful result of this trend will cause a greater allocation of federal 
resources to the source of the overfishing problem-foreign fishing 
operations in the Fishery Conservation Zone. 188 
The Baranof was a vessel owned by Baranof Fisheries, 189 a Wash-
ington State limited partnership. 190 The Baranof was registered with 
the U.S. Coast Guard and had its home port in Seattle, Washing-
ton. 191 The vessel was also licensed to fish in Alaska and had been 
issued an Alaskan Department of Fish and Game vessel number. 192 
On May 9, 1981, officers of the Alaska State Division of Fish and 
Wildlife Protection seized the Baranof in Dutch Harbor, Alaska un-
der the authority of a valid warrant. 193 On May 11, 1981, the State 
of Alaska filed a civil complaint in rem (the vessel was the only 
183 Id. See also 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(7) (1982). One of the seven national standards the regional 
councils is required to follow is: "(7) Conservation and management measures, where practic-
able, shall minimize costs and avoid unnecessary duplication." 
The legislative history of the MFCMA also suggests a more limited federal obligation to 
manage. There was deliberate mention that FMP's would be prepared only on an as needed 
basis. See H.R. REP. No. 445, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. at 13 (1975). 
Also, current guidelines to the regional councils specify that each council should assess "all 
the fisheries within the geographic area of authority" and "identify those fisheries requiring 
plan development and ... set priorities for plan development." 50 C.F.R. § 602.5(a)(1) (1982). 
184 Greenberg & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 633-34. 
185 Alaska v. FIV Baranof, 677 P.2d 1245, 1252 (Alaska 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 98 
(1984). See infra notes 349-68. 
186 Baranof, 677 P.2d at 1245. 
187Id. 
188 H.R. REP. No. 445, supra note 2, at 34. 
189 Baranof, 677 P.2d at 1247. 
190Id. 
191Id. at 1247. 
192 I d. at 1248. 
193Id. 
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named defendant) in the Superior Court for the forfeiture of the 
Baranof pursuant to Alaska law. 194 It was undisputed that the alleged 
violations occurred outside the three-mile limit of the Alaskan ter-
ritorial sea. 195 
In its answer, the Baranof alleged that Alaska fishing regulations 
should not apply to a vessel operating beyond the territorial sea. 
The Baranof argued that the Magnuson Act forbids the enforcement 
of state law in the Fishery Conservation Zone, particularly since the 
enforcement was attempted against a vessel that was registered and 
home-ported outside Alaska. 196 Indeed, at the time this litigation 
began, the courts were not in complete agreement concerning the 
proper state role in extraterritorial fishery management after 1976.197 
By authorizing state regulatory jurisdiction beyond the three-mile 
limit over any fishery not subject to an FMP, the Barano.f98 decision 
allows states a more substantial role in the management of domestic 
fishing operations. 
The court in Alaska v. FIV Barano.f99 discussed three areas of 
dispute concerning the application of state fishery regulations beyond 
the territorial sea after the Magnuson Act. Two of the court's con-
cerns involve the interpretation of specific provisions of the Mag-
nuson Act. The preemption of state law under the Supremacy clause 
was the final issue resolved by the Alaskan Supreme Court. 
First, the Baranoj2°O court concluded that section 1856(a) of the 
Magnuson Act permits extraterritorial state regulation of vessels 
registered with the forum state. The fact that a vessel was licensed 
under federal documentation statutes and home-ported outside 
Alaska did not preclude it from being considered registered under 
state law and thus subject to Alaskan king crab regulations beyond 
state waters. 201 
Second, the Alaska Supreme Court agreed with petitioners that 
section 1861(d) of the Magnuson Act does indeed grant federal courts 
exclusive jurisdiction over cases arising under provisions of the 
Act.202 However, the court found that the violations at issue in the 
194 Id. 
195Id. 
196Id. at 1245-48. See infra notes 225-55. 
197 Taylor, Recent State Court Decisions Create Uncertainty For State Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction, TERRITORIAL SEA, Vol. III, No.1 at 6 (1983). 
198 677 P.2d 1245 (1984). 
199 Id. 
200 Id. at 1251-52. See infra notes 210-55. 
201 Baranof, 677 P.2d at 1251. 
202Id. at 1252-53. See infra notes 256-90. 
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Barano.f03 case did not arise under the provisions of the Magnuson 
Act, but from Alaskan statutes and regulations. As a result, Alaska 
state courts have the authority to hear cases involving violations of 
Alaska law in the Fishery Conservation Zone. 204 
Third, the Barano.f05 court concluded that in the present case the 
Magnuson Act did not implicitly or explicitly preempt state regula-
tion beyond the territorial sea. The Alaska Supreme Court rejected 
the petitioners' preemption argument on the ground that the regional 
council representing Alaska had not promulgated a regional man-
agement plan for the king crab fishery.206 As a result, the court 
concluded that there existed no direct conflict between the Magnuson 
Act and Alaska law. 207 The court also found that, in any event, the 
Alaskan regulations were consistent with the overall goals of the 
Magnuson Act.208 Indeed, the absence of any state regulation would 
frustrate the most important purpose of the Magnuson Act, which 
is to provide proper management to ensure the conservation of ocean 
fisheries. 209 
B. Section 1856(a): The Role Of The States In Extraterritorial 
Management 
Section 1856(a) is the only portion of the Magnuson Act that 
attempts to delineate the scope of a state's authority beyond its 
territorial waters.210 The relevant portion of the provision reads that 
"no state may directly or indirectly regulate any fishing which is 
engaged in by any fishing vessel outside its boundaries, unless such 
vessel is registered under the laws of such state. "211 According to 
this provision, a state may no longer base jurisdiction over high seas 
fisheries upon contacts sufficient to establish personal and subject-
matter jurisdiction. 212 Now, the specific nexus of state registration 
203 BaranoJ, 677 P.2d at 1251. 
204 Id. 
205Id. at 1249-51. See infra notes 291-348. 




210 16 U.S.C. § 1856(a) (1982). 16 U.S.C. § 1853(b)(5) also discusses state management 
authority. It allows an FMP to "incorporate (consistent with national standards, the other 
provisions of this chapter, and any other applicable law) the relevant fishery conservation and 
management measures of the coastal state nearest the fishery." 
211 Id. 
212 See, e.g., State v. Bundrant, 566 P.2d 530 (Alaska), appeal dismissed sub nom. Uri v. 
Alaska, 429 U.S. 806 (1976); Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941); Bayside Fish Flour Co. 
v. Gentry, 297 U.S. 422 (1936); Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240 (1891). 
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is required. 213 When the nexus is established, states may exercise 
jurisdictional authority over high seas fisheries subject to federal 
constitutional restraints. 214 
Although it appears to provide for exclusive federal conservation 
and management authority over fisheries in the FCZ, section 1856(a) 
has been interpreted to negate those provisions of the Magnuson 
Act that call for exclusive federal authority on the high seas. 215 
Section 1856(a) explicitly grants management authority to the coastal 
states over vessels registered under their laws that operate on the 
high seas. Most courts allow state jurisdiction in federal waters by 
interpreting the Magnuson Act's other provisions concerning exclu-
sive federal jurisdiction in the FCZ to mean exclusive in regard to 
foreign nations, not the individual states. 216 
The first issue addressed by the court in Barano.f17 involves the 
question of how a vessel is registered under the laws of the state 
according to section 1856(a). The legislative history provides little 
guidance when interpreting this clause for the purposes of the Mag-
nuson Act. 218 The major debate regarding the interpretation of sec-
tion 1856(a) in the cases preceding Barano.f19 focused on whether 
Congress intended to confine this provision to federal registration 
requirements, or whether Congress intended instead to give effect 
to state registration laws. A second and related issue addressed by 
the court Barano.f20 was whether section 1856(a) permitted Alaska 
to apply state fishing laws upon a vessel home-ported in Seattle, 
Washington. 
Basically, the Barano.f21 court refused to attach a federal meaning 
to section 1856(a) and held that this provision was intended to include 
all vessels registered with Alaska for the purpose of commercial 
213 Greenberg & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 669. 
214 [d. 
215 Baranof, 677 P.2d 1245; Anderson Seafoods Inc. v. Graham, 529 F. Supp. 512 (N.D. Fla. 
1982); People v. Weeren, 26 Cal. 3d 654, 607 P.2d 1279, 163 Cal. Rptr. 255, cert.denied, 449 
U.S. 803 (1980). 
216 Respondent's Brief In Opposition To Writ of Certiorari at 16, Alaska v. FIV Baranof, 
677 P.2d 1245 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 98 (1984) (citing H.R. REP. No. 445, supra note 
2, at 42). 
217 16 U.S.C. § 1856(a) provides in relevant part: "[nlo state may directly or indirectly 
regulate any fishing which is engaged in by any fishing vessel outside its boundaries, unless 
such vessel is registered under the laws of such state." 16 U.S.C. § 1856(a) (1982). 
218 Comment, The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, supra note 40, at 
322. 
219 677 P.2d at 1251-52. 
220 [d. 
221 [d. 
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fishing. The Alaska Supreme Court reasoned that the federal docu-
mentation system for ocean vessels bore absolutely no relation to 
the state's regulation of fisheries. 222 The Barano.f23 holding also 
means that vessels docked outside the state are subject to Alaskan 
regulation in the FCZ, as long as they are registered with the state 
for the purposes of commercial fishing. The Barano.f24 court un-
doubtedly recognized that a broad reading of section 1856(a) pro-
motes the federal objective of conserving and managing the nation's 
off-shore resources as set out in the Magnuson Act. 
1. The Issue of Federal Registration 
In Alaska v. FN Baranoj,225 the court considered the state's 
registration clause in the context of a state prosecution of a vessel 
that had illegally harvested king crabs in the FCZ. The Baranof was 
regulated by three different governments: it had federal documen-
tation, including an issued Coast Guard number; it was licensed 
through the State of Washington; and it carried a commercial reg-
istration issued by the Alaska Fish and Game Department permit-
ting it to harvest king crab. 226 
The Baranof was unsuccessful in proving that, in light of its federal 
documentation, it should not be subject to Alaskan regulations in 
federal waters.227 The Baranof contended that this registration pro-
vision was confined to the federal registration requirements that 
existed at the time the Magnuson Act was enacted. 228 According to 
the federal scheme, the Baranof was registered only in the state of 
Washington. 229 The court reasoned that to limit the scope of section 
l856(a) in this manner would render the Magnuson Act's express 
recognition of state extraterritorial jurisdiction virtually meaning-
less. 23o An understanding of the terminology of the federal documen-
2'22 [d. 
223 See infra notes 225-55. 
224 [d. 
225 677 P.2d at 1252. 
226 [d. at 1247-48. 
227 [d. at 1252. 
228 [d. at 1251. 
229 46 U.S.C. § 17 repealed by Vessel Documentation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-594, § 127, 94 
Stat. 3459 (1980). 
"Every vessel not enrolled or licensed, shall be registered by the collector of that collection 
district which includes the port to which such vessel shall belong at the time of her registry; 
which port shall be deemed to be that at or nearest to which the owner, if there be but one, 
or if more than one, the husband or acting or managing owner of such vessel usually resides." 
230 Baranof, 677 P.2d at 1252. Many states do not require state identification numbers for 
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tation system is necessary to fully understand the Baranof231 deci-
sion. 
The federal vessel documentation system begins with the classi-
fication of only those vessels over five net tons; lighter vessels are 
exempt from all federal requirements. 232 The federal system then 
makes a distinction between those vessels that are enrolled and those 
that are registered. 233 Registration is a very old term of art under 
the federal scheme and is reserved solely for ships engaged in foreign 
trade. 234 The term has no meaning in the domestic fishing context 
since the basic purpose of federal registration is to declare a vessel's 
nationality, and thus to assure the proper payment tariffs and 
taxes. 235 
Under the federal documentation system, enrolled vessels are 
distinguished from registered vessels in that they are engaged in 
domestic trade or fishing activities. 236 Enrollment is another way to 
declare the nationality of a vessel; but it is also a prerequisite to the 
procurement of a license in the federal system. 237 A license, in turn, 
regulates the use to which a vessel is put.238 Uses like fishing or 
commercial trade are statutorily mandated, and federal law provides 
that only properly enrolled and licensed vessels are entitled to the 
privilege of the specific use delineated in the license. 239 
vessels that are federally licensed and enrolled. 1) MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90(B) § 2(6) 
(West 1969). 
2) Cal. Veh. Code § 9840-9860. (West 1971). 
Thus, if regulation were meant to mean only documentation under state law, many fishing 
vessels would simply not be so documented. In such circumstances, even where no FMP 
covers a fishery meaningful state regulation would be precluded. This would result in a 
jurisdictional void and run counter to one purpose of the MFCMA, which is to coordinate and 
integrate federal and state roles in fishery management. 
231 [d. 
232 Douglas v. Seacoast Products, 431 U.S. 265, 273 (1976) (citing 46 C.F.R. § 67.01-11(a)(5) 
(1976)). 
233 [d. at 272-73. 
234 [d. (citing 46 U.S.C. § 11-85 (1982)). 
235 The Mohawk, 3 Wall. 566, 571 (1866). 
See also Greenberg & Shapiro, supm note 9, at 670 n.160. For a number of reasons it seems 
unlikely that Congress in section 1856(a) was contemplating an analogous classification at the 
state level. First, the term "registration" as used in federal statutes has no meaning in the 
domestic fishing context. Second, the basic purpose of federal documentation laws is to declare 
a vessel's nationality - a purpose unrelated to the management and conservation goals of the 
MFCMA. Third, the licenses issued by the United States government for fishing are mainly 
to prevent fraud on the federal revenue. The licenses are issued upon satisfaction of certain 
requirements relating to identification, measurement, safety and U.S. ownership. These re-
quirements also have no particular relevance to fisheries management. 
236 Douglas, 431 U.S. at 273. See generally 46 U.S.C. §§ 251-351 (1982). 
237 The Mohawk, 3 Wall. 566, 567 (1866). 
238 Douglas, 431 U.S. at 273. 
239 [d. 
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The terminology of the federal documentation system reveals four 
reasons why Congress never intended section l856(a) to mean reg-
istration under federal documentation laws. First, federally regis-
tered vessels are not engaged in fishing operations, but instead are 
involved solely in foreign trade. 240 Second, the major purpose for 
registration in the federal system is to declare a vessel's nationality, 
not to supervise fishing operations. 241 Third, courts assume that 
Congress understands the terminology of federal statutes. Accord-
ingly, under a federal interpretation of section l856(a) Congress 
would have called for licensed vessels, not vessels registered under 
state law. 242 Fourth, a vessel registered under federal system would 
probably never engage in the harvest of king crabs off the coast of 
Alaska. As a result, the Barano.f43 court held that the only manner 
in which a vessel can be registered under section l856(a) is with the 
state of Alaska. 
2. The Home-Port Argument 
In maritime practice, a vessel is recognized as having only one 
official home; the port identified as the place of registration is con-
sidered the legal domicile of the vessel. 244 The Baranof was home-
ported in Seattle, Washington, and petitioner claimed that Washing-
ton is the only state that can claim authority over the vessel. 245 
The Alaska Supreme Court rejected the Baranof's argument for 
several reasons. First, the court concluded that the analogy to mar-
itime law was incorrect. The Magnuson Act was not directly con-
cerned with vessel registration and navigation; rather, it was di-
rected toward the management and conservation of the nation's 
fisheries.246 The Barano.f47 court decided that the proper method of 
240 46 U.S.C. § 252, repealed by Vessel Documentation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-594, § 127, 94 
Stat. 3459 (1980). 
241 Douglas, 431 U.S. at 272-73. 
242 [d. 
243 677 P.2d lZ52. 
244 Respondent's Brief In Opposition To Writ Of Certiorari at 14, (citing 46 U.S.C. § 17 
(1976), repealed by Vessel Documentation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-594, § 127, 94 Stat. 3459 
(1980». 
245 Baranof, 677 P.2d at 1251. 
This has also been asserted in a law review article. See Fidel!, Enforcement of the FCMA 
of 1976: The Policeman's Lot, 52 WASH. L. REV. 513, 596 n.467 (1977). See also Comment, 
The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, supra note 40, at 325. 
246 Baranof, 677 P.2d at 1251. 
247 [d.; See also C. SANDS, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, § 46.06 at 63 (4th ed. 1973). 
Section 46.06 is part of the Plain Meaning Rule of section 46.01. Section 46.06 provides, "It 
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statutory construction requires a court to determine the interpre-
tation that is most consistent with congressional intent. To interpret 
section 1856(a) as limited to vessels docked in Alaska would run 
counter to the purposes of management and conservation and, con-
sequently, would violate a cardinal principal of statutory construc-
tion. 248 
The court's second reason for rejecting the home-port argument 
was that while the Baranof was docked in Seattle, a significant 
number of its operations occurred in and around Alaskan waters. 
The court noted that the Baranof complied with all the necessary 
vessel and gear registration requirements in order to fish in 
Alaska. 249 In fact, the Baranof was registered, or regulated, by the 
state under five different sections of the Fish and Game Code of the 
State of Alaska. 250 As a result, the Baranoj251 court found that the 
plain meaning of the language "under the laws of such state" in 
section 1856(a) should give effect to Alaskan registration require-
ments. 
Third, the Alaska Supreme Court recognized that a restrictive 
interpretation of section 1856(a) would give free reign to commercial 
fishermen operating on the high seas. At the time the Baranof was 
seized, only the state of Alaska was authorized to manage king crab 
fisheries in the FCZ because no FMP concerning the king crab had 
been promulgated by the regional council representing the area. 252 
The Baranoj253 court cited to cases from other jurisdictions to find 
that exclusion of state regulation on the high seas would create a 
danger of wholly unregulated exploitation of the king crab fishery. 
If Congress had intended such a drastic curtailment of state fishery 
jurisdiction, the Baranoj254 court reasoned that this intent would 
have been declared explicitly in the Magnuson Act. Undoubtedly 
aware of the various state mechanisms for establishing extraterri-
is an elementary rule of construction that effect must be given, if possible, to every word, 
clause, and sentence of a statute. A statute should be construed so that effect is give to all 
its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative, superfluous, or insignificant." 
248 2A C. SANDS, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, § 46.06 at 63 (4th ed. 1973). 
249 BaranoJ, 677 P.2d 1251-52. 
250 Id. at 1252 n.lO. 
251Id. 
252Id. at 1249. At the time the case reached the Alaska Supreme Court, the North Pacific 
Management Council had prepared an FMP and proposed regulations covering king crab 
fishing in the FCZ. Under this proposed plan, the fishery will be governed by federal standards 
which wholly incorporate the Alaskan king crab regulations. 
253 Id. at 1252, (citing People v. Weeren, 26 Cal. 3d 654 (1980),607 P.2d 1279, 163 Cal. Rptr. 
255, cen. denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980». 
254 Id. 
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torial jurisdiction, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that Con-
gress avoided all reference to traditional terms used in federal doc-
umentation laws, and premised continued state jurisdiction on the 
undefined and generic concept of local registration. 255 
C. Section 1861(d): The Dispute Over The Exclusive Jurisdiction 
of Federal Courts 
A second argument raised by the petitioners in Barano.f56 was 
that the state courts of Alaska lack the authority to enforce fishing 
regulations beyond their territorial sea. The Baranof claimed that, 
while section 1856(a) grants to the state the right to exercise rule-
making authority in some instances, section 1861(d) sets forth the 
proper forum for enforcing the entire regulatory scheme. 257 Section 
1861(d) reads, in relevant part, that "[t]he district courts of the 
United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction over any case or 
controversy arising under the provisions of this chapter."258 Basi-
cally, the Baranof argued that if Alaska has the authority by virtue 
of section 1856(a) to enforce its regulations against state registered 
vessels in the FCZ, then Alaska was required to utilize a federal 
255Id. Despite being homeported in the state of Washington, it was clear that the Baranof 
was exploiting resources off the Alaskan coast. Also, most vessels harvesting from this fishery 
will be registered with the state. This is not true for other areas of the coastal U.S .. 
For example, the New England Fishery Management Council has approved an FMP which 
establishes a licensing scheme over the American lobster fishery for the five state area. This 
plan reflects the jurisdictional problems in managing this lucrative fishery - there are one 
federal plan and three state schemes within 20 miles of one another off the coast of New 
Hampshire. See 48 Fed. Reg. 36,267 (Aug. 10, 1983). 
The implementing provisions of the New England Regional Council's FMP for the American 
lobster fishery provide that any person choosing to fish only in state waters can continue to 
do so and still remain governed by state rules alone. However, a person fishing in the FCZ 
must comply with the more restrictive rule (which can be either a federal or state plan) 
regardless of whether the lobsters are taken in the territorial sea or the FCZ. 
One commentator believes this proposal may be open to constitutional challenge. Such a 
challenge could be successful provided that Massachusetts and New Hampshire fishermen are 
both fishing in the FCZ and the Massachusetts regulations are stricter than the regional 
council's FMP, and the New Hampshire rules are more lenient than those governing the 
lobster fishery. Presumably, the Massachusetts fishermen must comply with state regulations 
even in the FCZ, while the New Hampshire residents would be subject to federal standards. 
The Massachusetts resident could then argue that there was a violation of the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause and National Standard 4 of the MFCMA - "conservation and management 
measures shall not discriminate between residents of different states." TERRITORIAL SEA Vol. 
IV, No.1 at 10 (1984). 
256 BaranoJ, 677 P.2d at 1252. 
257 Appellee's Brief at 14-15, Alaska v. FIV Baranof, 677 P.2d 1245 (Alaska 1984), cert. 
denied, 105 S. Ct. 98 (1984). 
258 16 U.S.C. § 1861(d) (1982). 
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forum to enforce the application of state regulations beyond the 
territorial sea. 259 
On this issue, the Alaska Supreme Court overruled the State 
Superior Court by holding that state courts are authorized to hear 
cases concerning violations of state regulations on the high seas.260 
According to the Alaska Supreme Court, the central issue of this 
dispute focused on whether this case "arose under" the provisions 
of the Magnuson Act. 261 The court held that the alleged violations of 
the Alaska Fish and Game Code did not arise under the provisions 
of the Magnuson Act and, accordingly, that state court was the 
proper forum to litigate this dispute. 262 
Baranof contended that state regulatory authority existed in the 
FCZ only as authorized by the Magnuson Act and, therefore, became 
part of the federal fishery scheme enforced in United States District 
Courts. 263 The petitioner argued that the Magnuson Act expressly 
declares exclusive authority to regulate fisheries in section 1817 and 
circumscribes state extraterritorial jurisdiction in section 1856(a) to 
only vessels registered with the forum state. 264 The Baranof asserted 
that this language indicated that the source of Alaskan authority 
beyond the territorial sea does not derive from its traditional police 
powers, but from a limited grant of federal authority to Alaska in 
section 1856(a).265 Since every action to enforce state regulations in 
the FCZ is allowed by section 1856(a), the Baranof claimed that the 
present case arose under the provisions of the Magnuson Act. 266 
The Alaskan Attorney General's office successfully argued that 
this was an incorrect interpretation of section 1861(d).267 As noted 
earlier, the Magnuson Act provides exclusive federal jurisdiction 
only over cases "arising under the provisions of this chapter."268 
Section 1861(e) defines the "provisions of this chapter" as regulations 
passed by the federal government,269 federally issued permits,270 and 
international fishery agreements.271 The state emphasized that in 
259 Appellee's Brief at 14-15. 
260 BaranoJ, 677 P.2d at 1253. 
261Id. 
262Id. 
263 Appellee's Brief at 15. 
264 Id. at 13-14. 
265Id. at 14. 
266 I d. at 15. 
267 BaranoJ, 677 P.2d at 1253. 
268 16 U.S.C. § 1861(d) (1982). 
269 16 U.S.C. § 1861(e)(1)(A) (1982). 
27°Id. 
271 16 U.S.C. § 1861(e)(1)(B) (1982). 
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Congress' careful allocation of fishery management between state 
and federal agencies, and of jurisdiction between state and federal 
courts, no mention was made in the definition of section 1861(e) of 
"arising under" to include state statutes or regulations. 272 In addi-
tion, the state noted that the legislative history also helped to define 
the enforcement actions Congress intended would arise under the 
Magnuson Act. The legislative history of the Magnuson Act indicates 
that the jurisdictional statement of section 1861(d) was inserted 
solely to ensure an American forum for foreign vessels and alien 
fishermen who violated the Act.273 It was not intended to divest state 
courts of their existing jurisdiction over domestic violations. 274 
Moreover, the BaranoJ275 court found that petitioner's argument 
ran counter to the well-established principle articulated in Gully v. 
First National Bank,276 that cases arise under federal law only if a 
federal right is a substantial and essential element of the claim upon 
which the result of the action depends. A suit based upon a violation 
of an Alaskan statute should therefore be heard in state court since 
the cause of action did not arise under an act of Congress or the 
U. S. Constitution - the sources of federal question jurisdiction.277 
The court noted that it was uncontested that the Baranof was cited 
and charged under Alaska Fish and Game regulations. 278 Accord-
272 Appellant's Brief at 19, Alaska v. FIV Baranof, 677 P.2d 1245 (Alaska 1984), cen. denied, 
105 S. Ct. 98 (1984). 
273Id. at 20. See also, H. R. REP., No. 445, supra note 2, at 42. 
Under the international agreement (ICNAF), each member country is expected to levy 
penalties on their own fishermen who violate the agreement and are apprehended by other 
member nations. In essence, the ICNAF asked violating nations to police themselves; this 
optimistic proposition did not work. 
274Id. 
275 677 P.2d 1245, 1252 (Alaska), cen. denied, 105 S. Ct 98 (1984). 
276 Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 105 (1936). The U.S. Supreme Court recently 
reaffirmed precedent by finding that the nature of an action, rather than its source, determines 
subject matter jurisdiction. Franchise Tax Board v. Laborers' Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 
(1983) (citing Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 116 (1936». 
In this decision, the Court reaffirmed the principle that a suit based upon a state statute 
does not arise under federal law because prohibited thereby. The Court also ratified the theory 
that a case arises under federal law when the vindication of a right under state law necessarily 
turns on some construction of federal law. The federal question must also appear on the face 
of the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint. 
As in Barano/, the dispute in Franchise Tax Board centered on state regulations promul-
gated by the California legislature. In Baranol, the MFCMA entered the proceedings only as 
a defense to a prosecution arising from the Alaskan Fish & Game Code. Attorney General's 
brief at 20. 
277 Baranol, 677 P.2d at 1253 (citing Franchise Tax Board v. Laborers' Vacation Trust, 463 
U.S. 1,8 (1983». 
278 Barano/, 677 P.2d at 1253. 
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ingly, the Alaska Supreme Court followed the well-pleaded complaint 
rule which allows for the removal of cases from a state forum only 
when plaintiff's complaint establishes that the case arises under 
federal law. 279 In this case, however, the Baranof merely asserted 
section 1861 of the Magnuson Act as a defense to a state law claim. 280 
Even if the source of state authority did derive from section 
1856(a), the nature of this state action was not a matter of federal 
question jurisdiction. 281 Instead, the nature of the state enforcement 
action derived from the traditional police power authority to regulate 
a local food source.282 The United States Supreme Court has tradi-
tionally ruled that it is the federal nature of an action, not its source, 
that determines federal subject-matter jurisdiction.283 As argued by 
counsel for the Alaska Attorney General, the present action was 
state in nature since it pleaded only issues of state law284 and did 
not depend upon an interpretation of any federal statutes or regu-
lations. 285 For these reasons, the Alaska Supreme Court held that 
the BaranoJ286 case arose under state law, rather than from provi-
sions in the Magnuson Act. 
The BaranoJ287 court also ruled that pragmatic concerns should be 
a factor in determining whether this suit arose under federal law. 
The Supreme Court of Alaska accepted the argument that denial of 
state court jurisdiction over cases like Barano.f88 would injure the 
conservation and management purposes of the Magnuson Act by 
hampering enforcement. In his brief, the Attorney General noted 
that typically king crab harvesting violations occur hundreds of miles 
from the nearest federal court in Anchorage, even though three state 
courts are located convenient to these major fishing grounds. 289 The 
Barano.f90 court also noted that it is state courts that have developed 
279 Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 113 (1936). 
280 Franchise Tax Board, at 9-10. 
281 Federal question jurisdiction is defined by the United States Constitution: "The judicial 
power shall extend to all Cases in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws 
of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made under their Authority .... 
" U.S. CONST. art. III, sec. 2, cl. 1. 
282 Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894); Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240 (1891). 
283 Appellant's Brief at 20, Baranof (citing Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476, 483 
(1932)). 
284 Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Motely, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908). 
285 Smith v. Kansas City Title Co., 255 U.S. 180, 199 (1921). 
286 677 P.2d at 1253. 
287Id. 
288 Appellant's Brief at 21, Baranof 
289 Id. 
290 677 P.2d at 1253. 
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a familiarity with state fishery management laws and procedures, 
and that Congress surely recognized this when it allowed continued 
state authority under the Magnuson Act. 
D. Preemption: The Impact Of The Magnuson Act Upon State 
Fishery Management Beyond The Territorial Sea 
In drafting the Magnuson Act, it is clear that Congress narrowed 
state fishery management authority beyond the territorial sea. But 
the Barano.f91 court dismissed the claim that the Magnuson Act 
either implicitly or explicitly preempts state regulation of federal 
waters. The application of Alaska regulations to a vessel operating 
in the FCZ was upheld for three primary reasons. First, the court 
found that nowhere in the language of the Magnuson Act does Con-
gress explicitly claim to occupy the entire field of fishery manage-
ment. 292 To the contrary, section 1856(a) explicitly permits Alaska 
to regulate any vessels operating beyond its boundaries as long as 
they are registered with the state. 293 
Second, the court found it significant that the North Pacific Fish-
ery Management Council had not promulgated any FMP concerning 
the management of king crabs. 294 The court placed considerable 
weight on the amicus brief filed by the Secretary of Commerce 
asserting that the Magnuson Act evidences a congressional decision 
to assert federal jurisdiction in the FCZ without fully occupying the 
field. 295 In the absence of any federal supervision of the king crab 
fishery, the Barano.f96 court held that the state's extraterritorial 
application of its regulations was proper. 
Third, since the Alaska regulatory regime places conservation and 
management as its primary goals, the purposes of the Magnuson Act 
were met when state king crab regulations were applied in the 
FCZ.297 A holding that the Magnuson Act preempts all state regu-
lation beyond the three-mile limit (even in the absence of a conflicting 
291 677 P.2d at 1250. 
292 Baranol, 677 P.2d at 1249-50. The court ignored section 1812 of the Magnuson Act which 
declares: "The United States shall exercise exclusive fishery management authority in a 
manner provided for in this chapter, over the following: 1) All fish within the Fishery Con-
servation Zone .... " One explanation is that the Baranol court made it clear that the 
legislative history of the MFCMA concerning the provisions declaring exclusivity means 
exclusive in reference to other nations, not in the federal-state sense. 
293 16 U. S. C. § 1856(a) (1982). 
294 Baranol, 677 P.2d at 1249. 
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FMP) would frustrate the primary congressional objectives of con-
servation and management.298 The Barano.f299 court held that the 
Magnuson Act calls for proper management and conservation of 
fisheries in the FCZ, but not exclusive management in this area. 
The court found that Alaska can fill any gaps in the federal regime 
concerning domestic exploitation of the king crab fishery. 300 
Preemption analysis begins with Article VI, the Supremacy 
Clause of the U. S. Constitution, which establishes federal law as the 
supreme law of the land and prohibits a state from enacting laws 
that would frustrate the enforcement of federal laws. 301 Despite this 
proviso, courts have held that a state exercise of the police power 
will not be superseded unless there is a clear and manifest intent on 
the part of Congress to occupy the field. 302 Moreover, if Congress 
does not expressly prohibit state involvement in an area, preemption 
will not be lightly inferred. 303 
The Barano.f04 court analyzed the impact of the Magnuson Act 
upon state extraterritorial fishery management in two ways. First, 
the court searched the provisions of the Magnuson Act for explicit 
preemption of state regulations. 305 The court found that from the 
language of the Magnuson Act, Congress failed to declare that fed-
eral authority was exclusive over the FCZ.306 Second, the Barano.f07 
court decided that the structure and purpose of the Magnuson Act 
does not reveal an implicit congressional intent to occupy the entire 
field of fishery management in the FCZ. There are three ways that 
Congress impliedly preempts a state statute under the Supremacy 
Clause. First, the federal regulatory scheme may be so complete or 
pervasive that courts conclude Congress intended to regulate the 
field exclusively.308 Second, the federal interest may be so dominant 
that it does not admit concurrent state regulation.309 Finally, even 




301 u.s. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
302 Bararwj, 677 P.2d at 1249 (quoting Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 621, n.4 
(1978»; see also Webster v. Bechtel, 621 P.2d 890, 898 (Alaska 1980). 
303 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1946). 
304 677 P.2d 1245 (Alaska 1984). 
305 [d. at 1249-50. 
306 [d. 
307 [d. at 1250-51. 
308 Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633 (1973) . 
309 Northern States Power v. Minnesota, 477 F.2d 1143, 1146 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd, 405 U.S. 
1035 (1972). 
-------------------~---
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particular field, a state statute may still be preempted to the extent 
that it actually conflicts with a federal statute or regulation. 310 
1. Explicit Preemption 
The Barano.fll court found that nowhere in the language of the 
Magnuson Act does Congress explicitly claim to preempt the entire 
field of fishery management. The state's brief noted that when Con-
gress intends to occupy an area, it usually does so directly and 
explicitly.312 For example, the Employee Retirement Income Secu-
rity Program clearly provides: 
This chapter shall supersede any and all state laws insofar as 
they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan 
described in section lO03(a) of this title. 313 
The Magnuson Act contains no similar express preemption section. 
In fact, the court found that the Magnuson Act is devoid of language 
that can be construed as evidence of congressional intent to occupy 
the entire field of fishery management beyond the territorial sea. 314 
As noted previously,315 the sections of the Magnuson Act declaring 
exclusive federal management authority in the FCZ are intended to 
mean exclusive in regard to foreign nations, but not the individual 
states.316 Nowhere in the provisions of the Magnuson Act are the 
phrases, "shall supersede any and all state laws,"317 or "no state shall 
enact or enforce any law. "318 
310 Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 
U.S. 519, 525-26 (1977). 
311 677 P.2d at 1250. 
312 Respondent's Brief In Opposition to Writ of Certiorari at 10, Baranof. 
313Id. at 11 (citing the Employment Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) 
(1982». 
314 BaranoJ, 677 P.2d at 1250. However, two Florida courts have found this preemptive 
effect. Tingley v. Allen, 397 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. 1981); Livings v. Davis, 422 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 
1982). 
In Tingley, the court invalidated a Florida statute purporting to regulate shrimp fishing 
outside territorial waters. The court rested its holding solely on the grounds that, in its view, 
" ... the Magnuson Act specifically prohibits state regulation beyond its territorial waters." 
315 See supra notes 181-84. See also H.R. REP. No. 445, supra note 2, at 42. 
316 Respondent's Brief at 16, Baranof. 
317 Id. at 11. Other examples of federal statutes that explicitly preempt state regulation: 1) 
Federal Aviation Administration Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1305(A)(1) (1982) - "No state or subdivision 
thereof and no interstate agency of two or more states shall enact or enforce any law, rule, 
regulation, standard or other provision having the force and effect of law relating to costs, 
routes, or resource of any carrier having authority under subchapter IV of this chapter to 
provide interstate transportation;" 2) The Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. 
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To the contrary, section 1856(a) of the Magnuson Act specifically 
permits Alaskan regulation of vessels in federal waters so long as 
the vessels are registered with the state. 319 The Alaska Supreme 
Court found this provision to evidence a congressional decision to 
assert federal jurisdiction in the FCZ without foreclosing state man-
agement authority.320 The Magnuson Act limited state authority by 
allowing the exercise of extraterritorial state jurisdiction based upon 
the registration requirement, rather than the citizenship or minimum 
contacts tests. However, the language of the Act failed to expressly 
declare that state management authority beyond the territorial sea 
was preempted. 321 
The rationale utilized in Baranoj322 derived from two decisions 
made outside the State of Alaska. In People v. Weeren,323 the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court upheld the state's assertion of regulatory 
jurisdiction where the defendant's vessel, licensed with the state, 
was used to take swordfish in the FCZ in violation of state regula-
tion. As was the case in Baranof,324 the regional council governing 
California had not promulgated an FMP governing swordfish. Under 
similar analysis, in Anderson Seafood, Inc. v. Graham,325 a federal 
district court upheld a state statute prohibiting the use of a purse 
siene326 within or without the waters of Florida as applied to state 
registered vessels operating beyond the three-mile limit. The 
Baranoj327 court relied on the reasoning of these decisions to con-
§ 1379(a)(1) (1982) - "No state may enforce any state law or regulation relating to the taking 
of any species . . . unless the Secretary has transferred authority for the conservation and 
management of that species ... to the state under subsection (b)(1) o(this section." 
318 Appellant's Brief at 11, Baranof 16 U.S.C. § 1856(a) (1982) provides: "Nothing in this 
chapter shall be construed as extending or diminishing the jurisdiction or authority of any 
state within its boundaries. No state may directly or indirectly regulate any fishing which is 
engaged in by any fishing vessel outside its boundaries, unless such vessel is registered under 
the laws of such state." 
319 16 U.S.C. § 1856(a) (1982). 
320 Baranoj, 677 P.2d at 1250. 
321 [d. 
322 [d. 
323 [d. (quoting People v. Weeren, 26 Cal. 3d 654, 607 P.2d 1279 (1980), cert. denied, 449 
U.S. 839 (1980)). 
324 [d. 
325 Baranoj, 677 P.2d at 1250 (quoting Anderson Seafoods Inc. v. Graham, 529 F.Supp 512 
(N.D. Fla. 1982)). 
326 A purse seine is a large net designed to be set by two boats around a school of fish. It 
is arranged so that after the ends are brought together the bottom can be closed. WEBSTER'S 
THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1847 (1982). 
327 Baranoj, 677 P.2d at 1250. Two recent Florida decisions have added another requirement 
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clude that the Magnuson Act does not expressly preempt state reg-
ulation of vessels harvesting king crab beyond the territorial sea. 
2. Implicit Preemption 
Neither could the BaranoJ328 court conclude that the structure and 
nature of the Magnuson Act implicitly preempts all state regulation 
in federal waters. As a general rule, when Congress does not ex-
pressly preempt state law, courts determine whether there is an 
implied intent to preempt. 329 However, this congressional intent is 
not lightly inferred. 330 For several reasons, the Alaska Supreme 
Court found that the structure and nature of the Magnuson Act fails 
to reveal an implicit preemption of state fishery management in the 
FCZ. 
First, the court noted that section 1856(a) specifically permits 
extraterritorial jurisdiction over vessels registered with the state. 331 
Due to this provision, there was never a complete delegation of 
regulatory power from Congress to the Secretary of Commerce over 
fishery management in the FCZ.332 As a result, petitioner's argu-
ment, that cases holding that the very delegation of regulatory 
power to an administrative agency supersedes state regulations, was 
to valid state enforcement of its fishing regulations beyond the territorial sea. The Florida 
Supreme Court in Southeastern Fisheries v. Department of Natural Resources, 435 So. 2d 
1351 (Fla. 1984) requires a specific declaration within a state statute of extraterritorial appli-
cation before it will be upheld in Florida courts. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals went 
along with this rationale in Bethell v. Florida, 741 F.2d 1341 (11th Cir. 1984). The crucial 
language in Southeastern Fisheries reads as follows: 
The state's authority to regulate in these waters is only by the consent and 
acquiescence of the federal government. We find that if there is to be a confrontation 
between the state and federal government, then the legislature should expressly 
declare an intent to apply outside state waters. . . . Since there is no clear expression 
by the legislature ... we find it would be improper to apply this statute in extra-
territorial waters by implication and confront the federal government with its as-
serted validity. 
Southeastern Fisheries, 435 So. 2d at 1355 (Fla. 1984). 
328 Baranoj, 677 P.2d at 1250-51. 
329 Webster v. Bechtel, 621 P.2d 890, 898 (Alaska 1980); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 
U.S. 151, 157-58 (1978). 
330 Alaska Board of Fish & Game v. Thomas, 635 P.2d 1191, 1193 (Alaska 1981); Florida 
Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963), reh'g denied, 374 U.S. 858 (1963). 
See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 6-25 at 384. 
331 Baranof, 677 P.2d at 1250. 
332Id. 
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not applicable. 333 In those cases, Congress had delegated to the 
federal agency exclusive jurisdiction over a regulatory area. 334 
The interpretation of the Magnuson Act asserted by the Secretary 
of Commerce also persuaded the Baranof335 court to conclude that 
the Magnuson Act does not implicitly preempt state regulation of 
extraterritorial fisheries. As the federal official charged with imple-
menting the Magnuson Act, the Secretary of Commerce filed a brief 
amicus curiae to argue for the enforcement of state king crab reg-
ulations in federal waters.336 The Secretary recognized that, in this 
instance, the absence of a cooperative state and federal management 
scheme would have a crippling effect on the major objectives of the 
Magnuson Act. 337 While the interpretation of a statute by the agency 
responsible for its administration is not controlling, the Baranof338 
court accorded considerable weight to the Secretary's arguments. 
Third, the State's brief noted that the legislative history of the 
Magnuson Act does not manifest any intent to preempt state au-
thority beyond the three-mile limit. 339 During consideration of the 
Magnuson Act, there was substantial congressional attention given 
to the inadequacies of international treaties intended to protect do-
mestic resources from foreign overfishing. The legislative history 
reveals a determination that the proposed Magnuson Act should 
contain a provision whereby foreign violators would be subject to 
the jurisdiction of United States courtS. 340 As a result, the concept 
of exclusive jurisdiction meant exclusive in the sense that no other 
nation had authority or jurisdiction over fishing operations within 
the FCZ.341 In sum, the legislative history of the Magnuson Act 
reveals that federal jurisdiction was to apply to the heretofore un-
reachable foreign vessels; Congress did not intend to preempt legit-
imate state fishery management programs directed at domestic fish-
ermen. 342 
333 Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York 
State Labor Relations Board, 330 U.S. 767 (1947). 
334 Id. 
3.% 677 P.2d at 125l. 
336 Brief of the Secretary of Commerce as Amicus Curiae at 10-11, Baranoi, 677 P.2d 1245 
(Alaska), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 98 (1984). 
337 I d. at 15. 
338 677 P.2d at 125l. 
339 Appellant's Brief at 16, Baranof. 
34°Id. at 18-19. 
341Id. 
342 Id. 
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Finally, the Baranoj343 court noted that federal preemption will 
not be implied where the Alaska statutes at issue are consistent with 
the stated purpose of the Magnuson Act. At the time of the 
Baranoj344 decision, the North Pacific Fishery Management Council 
had yet to promulgate an FMP concerning the management of the 
king crab fishery. The court found that, since the basic purposes of 
the Magnuson Act and the state king crab regulations are harmo-
nious, a finding of federal preemption would not only jeopardize the 
fishery, but also frustrate Congress' stated goals of conservation and 
management. 345 The state argued that the findings, purpose, and 
policy of the Magnuson Act focus on the very same conservation and 
management objectives found in the Alaska Constitution and the 
state's Fish and Game Code. 346 The Alaskan king crab regulations, 
according to the state, implement all the conservation and manage-
ment objectives in the Bering Sea that would be required by the 
Magnuson Act. 347 The Baranoj348 court accepted this argument and 
noted that the North Pacific Fishery Management Council was in 
the process of drafting an FMP for the king crab fishery that wholly 
incorporates the Alaskan regulations. For these reasons, it was 
343 677 P.2d at 1251. 
344 [d. at 1249. 
345 [d. at 1251. 
346 Appellant's Brief at 14-15, Baranof 
The purposes, findings, and policies of the MFCMA at section 1801 focus on the 
same conservation and development objectives found in the Alaska Constitution and 
Fish & Game Code. Alaska Constitution, Article VIII, §§ 1,2,4; ALASKA STAT. 
§§ 16.05.010, 16.05.020, 16.05.221. 
In particular, the state must provide for "the utilization, development, and 
conservation" of fisheries resources. Alaska Constitution, Article VIII, § 2. The 
MFCMA has similar objectives at §§ 1801(a)(5),(6),(7); 1801(b)(l),(2),(3),(6); 
1801(c)(1),(2),(3),(5); and 1851(a)(1),(2), (4),(5), (6),(7). 
Alaska's management program must also conform to the sustained yield principle. 
Alaska Constitution Article VIII, § 4. Similarly, the Magnuson Act calls for an 
optimum yield on a continuing basis. §§ 1801(b)(4), 1851(a)(1). 
Alaska's fishery resources are reserved to the people for common use. Alaska 
Constitution, Article VIII, § 3, and all laws governing the use of natural resources 
in the state must apply "equally to all persons similarly situated." Alaska Constitu-
tion, Article VIII, § 17. Similarly the federal goals require that management mea-
sures not discriminate between residents of different states and be fair and equitable 
to all fishermen. MFCMA § 1851(a)(4). 
Alaska king crab regulations implement all of the MFCMA's conservation and 
development purposes in the Bering Sea by establishing fishing areas, fishing seasons, 
and size limits. 
For these reasons the purposes of the state regulations complement, rather than 
frustrate the purposes of the Magnuson Act. 
347 Appellant's Brief at 14-16 (citing ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, §§ 34.800,34.810,34.825). 
348 677 P.2d at 1251. 
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established that the purpose of the state's regulations assure, rather 
than frustrate, the purposes of the Magnuson Act. 
V. IMPLICATIONS OF ALASKA V. FIV BARANOF 
The most significant aspect of the Barano.f49 decision is the finding 
that a vessel does not have to be home-ported in a state to be 
considered registered in that state for the purposes of section 
1856(a). The Barano.f50 court properly interpreted the registration 
requirement to include any vessel authorized by the forum state to 
pursue commercial fishing operations. This approach grants a much 
broader scope of state management authority in federal waters than 
commentators originally anticipated. There are provisions in the fish 
and game codes of many states that require the registration of 
nonresident vessels and operators who harvest fish for commercial 
purposes in and beyond the territorial sea of the coastal state. 351 
Like Alaska, most coastal states have provisions granting authority 
over nonresident commercial fishermen who operate in or adjacent 
to state waters.352 The Barano.f53 court's interpretation of the reg-
istration requirement thus allows for virtually the same extraterri-
torial jurisdiction over nonresidents that was provided by landing 
laws and minimum contacts analysis in the pre-Magnuson Act era. 
349 677 P.2d 1245 (Alaska 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 98 (1984). 
350 Id. 
351 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 370.06(2) (West 1980) ("Aliens and nonresidents shall pay 
annual license tax of $25 before taking saltwater fish from the waters of this state."); ME. 
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 6501 (1982) ("It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in the 
activities authorized ... without a current commercial fishing license."); OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 508.265 (1984) ("The licensing of any boat pursuant to this chapter to take food fish for 
commercial purposes from the waters of this state or land food fish from the waters of the 
Pacific Ocean at any point in this state shall constitute registration for such vessels under the 
laws of this state for the purposes of section 306(a) or 1856(a) of the Fishery Conservation 
and Management Act of 1976."); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 20-4-1 (1981) ("No person shall engage 
in the taking for sale, by any manner, method, or contrivance, of any marine finfish, shellfish, 
crustacean, or other invertebrates and no vessel, boat, trap, seine, or other fishing gear shall 
be used in the taking for sale of any marine finfish, shellfish, crustacean, or other invertebrate 
unless a license thereof has been obtained as provided in this title. "); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 75.28.130 (1984) ("It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in the activities authorized 
by this license under this section without a current license. It shall be unlawful for any person 
to engage in any phase of the commercial fishing industry or to operate any fishing gear known 
as or classified as commercial fishing gear ... without having first obtained and having in 
possession such licenses or delivery permits herein specified."). See also R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 
20-4-5, 20-6-4, 20-6-6 (1981). 
352 ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.480 (1984) (Nonresident Commercial Fishing License). 
353 677 P.2d 1245 (Alaska 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 98 (1984). 
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The Barano.f54 court's resolution of the preemption issue is not as 
significant since there was no direct conflict between the federal and 
state regulations governing the king crab fishery. The North Pacific 
Regional Fishery Management Council had yet to promulgate an 
FMP concerning the king crab fishery.355 Therefore, it was not re-
markable that the Alaska court would validate state regulation of 
this important resource in the absence of any federal regulations 
covering the FCZ. As a result, Barano.f56 merely stands for the 
proposition that state regulation of an extraterritorial fishery is valid 
in the absence of federal involvement. However, it is undoubted that 
in light of the decision in Baranof, 357 a properly promulgated FMP 
will supersede conflicting state regulation of fishing operations in the 
FCZ. 
Due to this threat of federal preemption, the Department of Com-
merce has urged the regional councils to adopt a cooperative rela-
tionship with state authorities when formulating FMP's.358 The mo-
tivating factor for the Department is that the divergence of federal 
regulations for the FCZ, from the state regulations in the adjacent 
territorial sea, will complicate the compliance efforts of each juris-
diction by adding an additional element of proof to enforcement 
actions. 359 For example, if a particular size of cod may be taken 
legally in the FCZ pursuant to federal regulations, but the same size 
cod is illegal if taken within the territorial sea, it will be necessary 
for the state to prove where the cod was taken in order to enforce 
its regulations successfully.360 If the federal size limit were smaller 
then the state size limit, then federal enforcement officers would be 
required to prove the cod was taken in the FCZ.361 This was probably 
the motivating factor in the North Pacific Fishery Management 
Council's decision to adopt the State of Alaska's entire king crab 
regulatory scheme for federal waters. 
The Western Pacific Fishery Management Council followed the 
same approach. The Hawaiian Spiny Lobster FMP formulated by 
354 Id. 
355 I d. at 1251. 
356 Id. 
357 Id. 
358 Memorandum from Terry Leitzell to Jay Johnson. Assistant General Counsel for Fish-
eries, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Suppression and Jurisdictional Op-
erations Under § 306 of the Magnuson Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1856(a) (1982) [hereinafter cited as 
Memorandum from Terry Leitzelll. 
359 I d. at 15. 
360 [d. 
36! Id. at 15-16. 
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the Western Pacific Council appears to have served as a vehicle for 
achieving a cooperative management scheme between the two gov-
ernments.362 The spiny lobster fishery off the Hawaiian Islands has 
been the subject of dispute between state and federal officials for 
some time. 363 A compromise was worked out between the State of 
Hawaii and the Western Pacific Council whereby the minimum size 
limits are identical in both state and federal waters.364 The Council 
decided to adopt state measures, and thereby successfully avoided 
the cumbersome legal and enforcement battles that had burdened 
the State of Alaska and the North Pacific Council. 
By negotiating this compromise, Hawaii now has a consistent 
minimum standard in both the state and federal waters surrounding 
the Islands. 365 This makes dockside enforcement much easier, since 
neither government is required to prove that the illegal fish were 
taken within their sphere of authority.366 This type of compromise is 
necessary to achieve an essential goal of the Magnuson Act: consis-
tent management authority throughout the range of a regulated 
fishery. 
The decisions of the Western Pacific and North Pacific Regional 
Councils, to adopt state regulations for federal waters, are evidence 
of a growing cooperative relationship between state and federal 
authorities. These two councils have followed the suggestion of the 
Department of Commerce, which has argued the incorporation of 
state regulations into FMP's to avoid the inconsistency problems 
noted earlier.367 The Department has also suggested a careful ex-
amination of existing state law to determine whether an FMP gov-
erning domestic fishing operations is even required. 368 The Depart-
ment of Commerce has come to realize that a cooperative relationship 
between state and federal authorities is the key to comprehensive 
362 Comment, Spiny Lobster Consistency Compromise, TERRITORIAL SEA, Vol. IV, No.1, 





367 Memorandum from Terry Leitzell, supra note 358, at 15-16. 
368 Id. However, the Department of Commerce does recognize that there will be situations 
where a regional council will reject the approach taken by adjacent states and will impose 
regulations which better suit the purposes of the Magnuson Act. In addition, in areas like 
New England, where a single fishery is often regulated by three states, it will be impossible 
for the regional council to avoid the inconsistency problem. In such situations, uniformity in 
the regulation of the FCZ and the territorial sea may be preserved by a state effort to conform 
their management schemes to the FMP covering a common fishery. If not, both governments 
will face difficulty in enforcing their regulatory schemes for the common fishery. 
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and effective fishery management from the shoreline to the two-
hundred mile limit. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Alaska Supreme Court in Barano.f69 recognized that a system 
of state extraterritorial enforcement is a valuable complement to the 
federal involvement mandated by the Magnuson Act. The court in 
Barano.f70 held that the Magnuson Act explicitly permits the exten-
sion of Alaskan regulatory authority over vessels registered with 
the state. And since the state regulation followed the Magnuson 
Act's basic goals of conservation and management, not only were 
the state regulations upheld, but the North Pacific Regional Council 
later adopted the entire state management scheme. 
In summary, the Barano.f71 court validated the state king crab 
regulations with respect to petitioner's three challenges. First, the 
court held that a vessel home-ported outside Alaska can be consid-
ered registered with the state under section 1856(a) of the Magnuson 
Act. A vessel is registered with Alaska under section 1856(a) if it is 
registered or licensed with the state for the purpose of commercial 
fishing. In so holding, the Barano.f72 court extended state jurisdic-
tion under section 1856(a) to nonresidents who are regulated by 
Alaskan commercial fishing statutes. 
Second, the court found that the Magnuson Act grants to the 
federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over cases arising under the 
provisions of the Magnuson Act. However, the Alaska court cor-
rectly found that the petitioner's claim did not arise under the pro-
visions of the Act. The Baranof was charged with the violation of 
state fishing regulations, not any provision promulgated by the fed-
eral government or the North Pacific Regional Council. In essence, 
the court in Barano.f73 held that state courts have the authority to 
enforce their fishing regulations even when the violation occurs out-
side the territorial sea. 
Third, the Barano.f74 court found that the Magnuson Act neither 
explicitly, nor implicitly, preempts state regulation of high seas fish-
eries. Local regulations are only invalidated where there is a direct 
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conflict between an FMP and a state fishery scheme. Since enforce-
ment problems result when the state and federal schemes conflict, 
the Secretary of Commerce successfully persuaded the North Pacific 
Regional Council to accept a uniform plan for the management of 
the king crab fishery in state and federal waters. 
This article's examination of the Magnuson Act supports the con-
clusion that fishery management on the high seas, far from being an 
exclusive federal function, may be best carried out through a coop-
erative allocation of responsibilities between the states and the fed-
eral government. Reliance on state authority is thus proper when 
federal management of domestic fishing is not necessary. As long as 
the regional councils act in accordance with the standards and prin-
ciples of the Magnuson Act, and as long as deference to state au-
thority is accompanied by adequate communication and oversight, 
then the objectives of the Magnuson Act will be fulfilled. The primary 
benefit of this cooperative relationship will be that federal resources 
can be allocated to the primary source of the overfishing problem -
foreign operations within the FCZ. 
